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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When a person suspected of a crime is arrested without a warrant, the 
Fourth Amendment guarantees that freedom may not be taken away 
except upon a neutral magistrate judge’s prompt confirmation that 
probable cause exists that this person in fact committed the crime.  In 
contrast, in the deportation process, a person is often detained for weeks 
before a judge determines that the noncitizen is actually deportable, thus 
justifying detention.  Even the separate procedures available to review 
custody do not suffice because the mandatory detention statute renders 
many detainees ineligible for review by a judge.  If they are entitled to a 
bond hearing, the presumption is detention, and the detainee must bear 
the burden of proving he is not a danger or a flight risk. 
In this Article, I make a modest proposal:  for post-entry social control 
acts of deportation, immigration detainees must be brought promptly 
                                                
  Associate Clinical Professor, Boston College Law School.  I am grateful for the 
comments of Geoffrey Heeren, Sabi Ardalan, Erin Corcorane, and participants at the 
Valparaiso Law Review Symposium on Immigration Detention on November 11, 2016.  This 
conference, which occurred three days after the election of President Trump, who promised 
significant increases in immigration enforcement and detention, came at the perfect moment 
to discuss these key issues.  I also would like to thank Mary Kate Sexton for her excellent 
research assistance. 
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before a neutral judge to determine whether probable cause exists to hold 
them.  I limit the reach of this proposal to the post-entry social control acts 
of deportation (as opposed to extended border control cases) because 
those are the deportation cases that most resemble punishment for a 
crime.  Also, for strategic reasons, those who have been admitted to the 
United States are better served by a quick probable cause hearing before 
an immigration judge, whereas entrants without inspection could benefit 
from more time to consult with a lawyer before any such hearing.  I also 
foresee that this proposal will lead the government to more carefully 
justify its decision to detain lawful permanent residents (LPRs), and thus 
LPRs, who have the strongest claims to procedural protections, will 
benefit the most from this additional procedure. 
This Article contributes to the growing literature about the need to 
import criminal justice rights into the deportation system.  Stephen 
Legomsky noted, as a general matter, that there are asymmetries between 
these systems—that immigration removal proceedings have incorporated 
many of the punishment-like features of a criminal trial, without 
importing the procedural protections of the criminal trial.1  Other 
scholarship has advocated for the application of other rights guaranteed 
in a criminal trial—court-appointed counsel, freedom from ex post facto 
laws, freedom from double jeopardy, proportionality principles, the 
confrontation clause, and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule—in 
removal proceedings.2  Christopher Lasch has focused on the Fourth 
                                                
1 See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:  Asymmetric Incorporation of 
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (declaring that enforcement 
features of the criminal justice model have been enforced in immigration law while 
adjudication features have been rejected).  “A pattern has emerged:  those features of the 
criminal justice model that can roughly be classified as enforcement have indeed been 
imported.  Those that relate to adjudication, in particular, the bundle of procedural rights 
recognized in criminal cases, which have been consciously rejected.”  Id. 
2 See Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in Immigration Court, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 675, 
675 (2015).  See also Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 417–18 (2012) (asserting that removal is sufficiently punitive to 
trigger constitutional proportionality review pursuant to the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); Jennifer 
Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?  Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1624–27 (2010) (proposing the application of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule in removal proceedings); Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to 
Believe”:  Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the 
Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2008) (urging for an 
application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule due to widespread constitutional 
violations by immigration officers and a fundamental change in immigration court practice 
since Lopez-Mendoza was decided); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment:  
Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 305, 339–40 (2000) (proposing the Eight Amendment’s requirement that the punishment 
be proportional to the offense, the ex post facto clause, and the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
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Amendment violations inherent in Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) detainer practices.3  Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia has 
commented on the lack of prompt review of detention as part of a larger 
set of recommendations to ICE to “inject humanity into its arrest, 
detention, and removal procedures . . . .”4  César Cuauhtémoc García 
Hernández has critiqued the immigration process in which the 
government can “merely lodge an accusation that a person has violated 
the law.”5 
Michael Kagan, in a recent Article, critiqued the practice of 
warrantless arrests without a prompt probable cause hearing by a neutral 
decisionmaker for immigration detainees.6  He writes: 
Until now, the means by which federal authorities take 
immigrants into custody have been insulated from 
constitutional scrutiny by the plenary power doctrine and 
by the premise that immigration law is civil, not criminal.  
These doctrines allowed the American immigration 
enforcement infrastructure to develop in a parallel 
universe for more than a century.  But rapid 
developments in case law in the twenty-first century have 
significantly stripped away this insulation.7 
                                                
counsel should apply in deportation proceedings); Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as 
Punishment:  A Historical Analysis of the British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern 
Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 119, 160–63 (1999) (presenting that the current 
deportation laws violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment); Nancy 
Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 97, 97 (1998) (advocating for the principles against retroactivity embodied in the ex post 
facto clause to apply to deportation proceedings); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation of an 
Alien for a Marijuana Conviction Can Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 13 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 454, 467 (1976) (finding that Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment 
analysis should apply to deportation for marijuana convictions). 
3 See, e.g., Christopher N. Lasch, Legal Problems With Detainers, LITIGATING IMMIGRATION 
DETAINER ISSUES, Ch. 34 (1st ed. 2011) (focusing on Fourth Amendment rights in ICE detainer 
practices).  See also Christopher Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue 
Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 165–66 (2008) (asserting current 
regulations regarding detainers overstep limited authority granted by Congress). 
4 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Under Arrest:  Immigrants’ Rights and the Rule of Law, 38 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 853, 888 (2008). 
5 César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Invisible Spaces and Invisible Lives in Immigration 
Detention, 57 HOW. L.J. 869, 882 (2014). 
6 See Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L.J. 
125, 166–67 (2015) (questioning warrantless arrests in which detainees are not granted a 
prompt probable cause hearing by a neutral decisionmaker). 
7 Id. at 167. 
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Kagan recommends that courts engage in statutory interpretation of the 
statute authorizing detention to correct this problem,8 and proposes the 
following:  (1) immigration judges should start holding probable cause 
hearings; (2) the Immigration and Nationality Act should be amended to 
state that the standard for arrests should be probable cause; and (3) if a 
person is held in immigration custody for more than seventy-two hours, 
an immigration judge must review his case to ensure the existence of 
probable cause.9 
In the present Article, I take Kagan’s identification of an important 
Fourth Amendment violation that is regularly occurring within 
immigration law and I make the proposal that only in post-entry social 
control types of deportation should such hearings occur.10  By “post-entry 
social control” acts of deportation, named by Daniel Kanstroom,11 I refer 
to the deportation of noncitizens who have been admitted to the United 
                                                
8 See id. (endorsing a focus on the existing provisions of the INA providing that an alien 
may be detained while it is decided whether or not they can remain in the United States).  
Specifically, he proposes that courts interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides:  “on a 
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a 
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States,” to include a probable 
cause hearing before a neutral immigration judge.  Id. at 167–68 (internal quotations omitted). 
9 See id. at 168 (remarking that immigration judges should distribute immigrant arrest 
warrants, the INA should be amended to clarify the probable cause standard for immigration 
arrests, and an immigration judge must review every case in which a person is in 
immigration custody for seventy-two hours after their arrest to ensure there is probable 
cause).  Kagan borrows the seventy-two hour requirement from state statutes that allow 
involuntary commitment, which is civil, without a neutral review for up to seventy-two 
hours.  Id. at 165–66.  He discusses a survey which revealed that only eight outlier states may 
allow involuntary commitment without a neutral review for up to seven days.  Id. at 165.  
The norm in state statues is for involuntary commitment to not surpass seventy-two hours 
without a neutral judge reviewing detention.  Id. at 166.  He notes that this right is guaranteed 
by statute rather than by judicial mandate.  Id.  See also Project Release v. Provost, 722 F.2d 
960, 975 (2d Cir. 1983) (declining to extend Gerstein to civil commitment statutes and finding 
no due process violation when the state statute provides for a judicial hearing within five 
days of demand by patient, relative, or friend, as well as habeas corpus relief). 
10 See Kagan, supra note 6, at 166–67 (criticizing warrantless arrest without a prompt 
probable cause hearing).  See also infra Part V (proposing that probable cause hearings only 
take place in post-entry social control types of deportation). 
11 DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION:  OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 5 (2007) 
[hereinafter KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION].  See also Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, 
Social Control, and Punishment:  Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1911 (2000) [hereinafter Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control] 
(presenting post-entry social control as a theory of deportation). 
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States but who are deportable for criminal12 or political conduct13—
conduct that arose after they entered the United States.14  More 
specifically, any non-citizen whom the government charges under the 
criminal or political grounds of deportability should get a probable cause 
hearing within seventy-two hours of arrest by the immigration 
authorities.15 
The United States deportation system has never seen such a need for 
review by the judiciary of ICE’s detention decisions, particularly in the 
context of criminal deportations.16  Within his first week in office, 
President Trump issued two Executive Orders calling for stricter 
immigration enforcement and a stronger border.17  The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Memos implementing his interior and border 
enforcement Executive Orders indicate that DHS will use every tool to 
enforce the immigration law, including increased detention.18  According 
                                                
12 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2012) (imposing deportation for crimes involving moral 
turpitude; aggravated felonies; crimes involving high-speed flight; failure to register as a sex 
offender; controlled substance offenses; drug abuse; espionage and treason crimes; crimes of 
domestic violence, stalking, or child abuse; violations of restraining order; and human 
trafficking); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4) (2012) (ordering deportation for espionage, sabotage, or 
criminal activity which endangers the public safety or national security). 
13 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4) (2012) (requiring deportation for noncitizen who engages 
in “any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the 
Government of the United States by force, violence, or other unlawful means”); 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C) (proscribing deportation for an “alien whose presence or activities in 
the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe would have 
potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States”). 
14 See Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky:  The 
Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1465 (2011) 
(defining post-entry social control). 
15 See infra Part V (urging that a noncitizen who faces deportation should be granted a 
probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours). 
16 See Donald S. Dobkin, Court Stripping and Limitations on Judicial Review of Immigration 
Cases, 28 JUD. SYS. J. 104, 107 (2007) (identifying Constitutional issues arising from Congress 
denying jurisdiction of the courts). 
17 See Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 
(Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Enhancing Public Safety] (ordering that agencies employ all 
lawful means to enforce the immigration laws of the United States); Border Security and 
Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) (requiring 
that agencies employ all lawful means to protect the United States’s border with Mexico and 
prevent further illegal immigration into the United States). 
18 See John Kelly, IMPLEMENTING PRESIDENT’S BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS POLICIES 2 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/ 
publication/implementing-presidents-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-
improvement-policies [https://perma.cc/JU27-K2ZP] [hereinafter Border Security 
Implementation Memo] (expressing that detention of undocumented aliens is the most efficient 
way to enforce immigration law and prevent crime).  See also John Kelly, ENFORCEMENT OF 
IMMIGRATION LAWS TO SERVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST 3 (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/enforcement-immigration-laws-serve-national-interest 
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to a June 2017 New Yorker article, “federal immigration authorities have 
made forty per cent more arrests than they did at the equivalent point in 
2016 . . . .” 19  From the beginning, President Trump has vowed to focus on 
deporting so-called “criminal aliens”20 and inflicting federal funding cuts 
on the so-called “sanctuary cities” that President Trump accused of 
shielding such “criminal aliens” from removal.21  His administration has 
added to the vast number of ICE arrests and deportations already 
occurring, particularly of noncitizens convicted of crimes.22 
In Part II, I outline the Supreme Court cases that have established the 
right to a prompt probable cause hearing in the criminal justice system 
when a suspect is arrested without a warrant.23  I compare these rights to 
                                                
[https://perma.cc/8QXB-B8AD] [hereinafter Enforcement Memo] (supporting the idea that 
the most efficient way to detain aliens who commit crimes is to replace existing ICE detainer 
forms with new ones). 
19 Jonathan Blitzer, What Will Trump Do with Half a Million Backlogged Immigration Cases?, 
NEW YORKER (June 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news-desk/what-will-trump-
do-with-half-a-million-backlogged-immigration-cases [http://perma.cc/2A5G-GACP]. 
20 See Ben Casselman, There Aren’t 2 To 3 Million Undocumented Immigrants With Criminal 
Records For Trump To Deport, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 14, 2016), http://fivethirtyeight.com/ 
features/there-arent-2-to-3-million-undocumented-immigrants-with-criminal-records-for-
trump-to-deport/ [http://perma.cc/6AC7-HH2N] (analyzing President Trump’s wish to 
deport two to three million immigrants who have committed crimes).  See also Michelle Ye 
Hee Lee, Trump’s Fuzzy Math on Undocumented Immigrants Convicted of Crimes, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/09/02/ 
trumps-fuzzy-math-on-undocumented-immigrants-convicted-of-crimes/?utm_term=7d87b 
fa2cacb [http://perma.cc/H9X7-LHTW] (clarifying that President Trump has called for the 
removal of all criminal aliens since 2015). 
21 See Enhancing Public Safety, supra note 17, at 8799 (declaring that all jurisdictions not 
in compliance with Federal law will not receive federal funds beyond what is required by 
law). 
22 See Anna D. Law, This Is How Trump’s Deportations Differ From Obama’s, WASH. POST 
(May 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/05/03/ 
this-is-how-trumps-deportations-differ-from-obamas/?utm_term=a6457ef2e550 
[http://perma.cc/E4Y8-35WQ] (illustrating that Trump’s administration continues to 
apprehend immigrants who have convicted crimes).  See also Department of Homeland 
Security, Table 41. Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Region and Country of Nationality:  
Fiscal Year 2015, HOMELAND SECURITY (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/ 
immigrationstatistics/yearbook/2019/table41 [https://perma.cc/23EN-JJN2] (noting the 
number of deported immigrants who committed crimes in 2015).  DHS maintains statistics 
of “aliens removed by criminal status,” which it refers to as the removal of anyone who has 
a prior criminal conviction.  Id.  In Fiscal Year 2015, of the 333,341 total number of persons 
removed, 139,950 were previously convicted of a crime.  Id.  See also Department of 
Homeland Security, Table 33. Aliens Apprehended:  Fiscal Years 1925 to 2015, HOMELAND 
SECURITY (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015/ 
table33 [http://perma.cc/PUF6-KHRN ] (exposing the number of aliens apprehended in 
2015).  In the same year, ICE arrested 462,388 individuals.  Id. 
23 See infra Part II (highlighting cases that have established that in the criminal justice 
system, when a suspect is arrested without a warrant, she has a right to a prompt probable 
cause hearing). 
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the immigration system’s statutory and regulatory scheme regarding 
warrantless arrests, detention, and review of these decisions by an 
immigration judge.24  In Part III, I describe court challenges in which 
noncitizens claimed the right to a prompt probable cause hearing to justify 
detention pending deportation.  Although these challenges have not won 
such a right, I discuss how the issue remains an open question.25  In Part 
IV, I examine why courts would take a fresh look at a right to a prompt 
probable cause hearing, particularly in light of Supreme Court cases such 
as Padilla v. Kentucky26 in 2010, Zadvydas v. Davis27 in 2001, and dicta from 
Arizona v. United States 28 in 2012.  The success of the ICE detainer litigation 
is yet another reason for courts to reexamine this issue.29  In Part V, I 
discuss my proposal in more detail, and justify why such prompt probable 
cause hearings should only happen in post-entry social control cases.30 
II.  CRIMINAL JUSTICE RIGHTS COMPARED TO IMMIGRATION RIGHTS 
It is first helpful to compare what occurs when a warrantless arrests 
happens within the criminal justice system, as opposed to the immigration 
system.31 
A. Rights After Warrantless Arrest in the Criminal Justice System 
In the criminal justice system, a probable cause hearing within forty-
eight hours of arrest is necessary to ensure that an arrestee’s Fourth 
                                                
24 See infra Part II (analogizing the criminal justice system to the immigration system 
regarding arrests without a warrant, detention, and judicial review of hearings of that 
nature). 
25 See infra Part III (considering the possibility of noncitizens obtaining the right to a 
prompt probable cause hearing). 
26 See 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (deciding that counsel must inform her client if his plea puts 
him at risk of deportation). 
27 See 533 U.S. 678, 669–700 (2001) (explaining that if a removal is not reasonably 
foreseeable that continued detention should be considered unreasonable and should not be 
authorized by statute). 
28 See 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012) (highlighting the procedure of a removal of an alien from 
the United States). 
29 See ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project, Recent Court Decisions Relating to ICE Detainers, 
ACLU (July 27, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/other/recent-ice-detainer-cases 
[http://perma.cc/DD6U-6DYV] (summarizing recent cases concerning ICE detainers). 
30 See infra Part V (opining that prompt probable cause hearings only take place in post-
entry social control cases). 
31 See infra Part II.A–B (comparing warrantless arrest in the criminal justice system with 
warrantless arrest in the immigration system). 
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Amendment rights are not violated.32  This probable cause hearing is 
different from the later arraignment.33 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause.”34  In 1948, in Johnson v. United States, the 
Supreme Court decided that to implement the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, whenever 
possible, the existence of probable cause must be decided by a neutral and 
detached magistrate.35  The Court wrote: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not 
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 
reasonable men draw from evidence.  Its protection 
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged 
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime.36 
Similarly, in the Court’s 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio, which allowed the 
police to stop and frisk a person in search of weapons when the officer has 
“reasonable suspicion,”37 the Court wrote: 
                                                
32 See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (rationalizing a 48-hour 
time period to await a probable cause hearing as complying with the promptness standard 
set forth in Gerstein).  See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (rendering a decision 
that a probable cause hearing must occur before an extended constraint of liberty after arrest 
to comply with the Fourth Amendment). 
33 See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 106 (holding that arraignment, which happens often 30 days 
after arrest, is insufficient to satisfy an arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights).  But see 
Riverside, 500 U.S. at 58 (reasoning that probable cause hearing and arraignment could be 
combined so long as the proceedings occurred within forty-eight hours). 
34 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
35 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (stating that to comply with Fourth 
Amendment rights a neutral magistrate must draw inferences based on the evidence). 
36 Id.  See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (expressing preference for use of 
warrants, stating, “‘good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.’ . . . If 
subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would 
evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only 
in the discretion of the police.”). 
37 See Terry v. United States, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968) (agreeing that police officers may 
stop and frisk someone in search of weapons if they have a reasonable suspicion).  See also 
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540, 627–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (declaring that the 
practice of stop and frisk is not always constitutional).  In 2013, a district court judge in the 
Southern District of New York ruled that while stop and frisk is constitutional under Terry, 
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The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes 
meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the 
conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be 
subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a 
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a 
particular search or seizure in light of the particular 
circumstances.38 
In 1975, in Gerstein v. Pugh, the Supreme Court specifically rejected a 
Florida procedure whereby a person could remain detained so long as a 
prosecutor filed an information.39  In describing the state court’s 
interpretations of its criminal procedure laws, the Court wrote, “[a]s a 
result, a person charged by information could be detained for a substantial 
period solely on the decision of a prosecutor.”40  The Court found that such 
detention violated a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights.41  Thus, to 
continue detention after initial arrest, the detached judgment of a 
magistrate judge is necessary; the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause 
is insufficient to protect Fourth Amendment rights.42  This Fourth 
Amendment rule applies to “any significant pretrial restraint on liberty.”43 
The Gerstein Court allowed few procedural rights in this probable 
cause hearing, reasoning that the “. . . sole issue is whether there is 
probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further 
proceedings.  This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary 
hearing.”44  Thus, the probable cause hearing could be held without the 
                                                
the New York City police where implementing “stop and frisk” in a manner that was 
unconstitutional.  Id. 
38 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
39 See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 118–19 (explaining that a person cannot be detained so long as 
a prosecutor has filed an information).  There was a Florida statute that “seemed to authorize 
adversary preliminary hearings to test probable cause for detention in all case . . . But the 
Florida courts had held that the filling of an information foreclosed the suspect’s right to a 
preliminary hearing.”  Id. at 105–06.  Florida courts also had held that habeas corpus could 
only be used in exceptional circumstances to test the probable cause for detention under an 
information.  Id. at 106.  There were two ways to obtain a judicial determination of probable 
cause:  first, by a special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after thirty days; and second, 
by arraignment, which was often delayed a month or more after arrest.  Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117 (finding a Florida law that made detainment for a substantial 
amount of time acceptable if the prosecutor decided so violates the Fourth Amendment). 
42 See id. (holding that it is unconstitutional for a prosecutor’s finding of proximate cause 
alone to be grounds for continued detention and a neutral magistrate is necessary to consider 
the evidence). 
43 Id. at 125 (emphasis added). 
44 Id. 
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appointment of counsel and without the Sixth Amendment right to 
confront one’s accuser (thus hearsay is admissible).45 
In 1991, in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,46 the Court clarified what 
would constitute a “timely” judicial determination of probable cause is 
forty-eight hours.47  The Court wrote that “the Fourth Amendment 
permits a reasonable postponement of a probable cause determination 
while the police cope with the everyday problems of processing suspects 
through an overly burdened criminal justice system.48  But flexibility has 
its limits; Gerstein is not a blank check.”49  The Court wrote that even if 
probable cause hearings are provided within forty-eight hours, there may 
still be “unreasonable delays”—for example, “delays for the purpose of 
gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill 
will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake.”50  The 
Court held that the county could combine probable cause determinations 
with arraignments, but that was not a reason to delay the probable cause 
hearing.51 
The Court’s reasoning in Gerstein and Riverside had its roots in two 
cases decided years earlier.52  In McNabb v. United States, the Court in 1943 
suppressed statements taken from a defendant who was detained for 
fourteen hours, never taken to a judge (although a federal statute required 
such judicial intervention), and repeatedly interrogated.53  Although the 
Court found a violation of a federal statute, not the Fourth Amendment, 
that statute provided a similar guarantee that a defendant be taken before 
the nearest judicial officer.54  In Mallory v. United States, the Court in 1957 
interpreted Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) to require the 
                                                
45 See id. at 121–22 (endorsing that a probable cause determination does not require 
appointment of counsel and that confrontation of the accuser is not useful in a probable cause 
determination). 
46 See 500 U.S. 44, 47 (1991) (determining the definition of promptness under Gerstein). 
47 See id. at 56 (conducting a probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours meets the 
promptness requirement set forth in in Gerstein). 
48 Id. at 55. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 56. 
51 See id. at 58–59 (explaining that probable cause determinations and arraignments can be 
combined, but that the combination does not justify a delay that exceeds the forty-eight hour 
limit). 
52 See Wendy L. Brandes, Post-Arrest Detention and the Fourth Amendment:  Refining the 
Standard of Gerstein v. Pugh, 22 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 445, 448 (1989) (describing the 
Court’s rulings in McNabb, and Mallory as the “roots” for the Court’s decision in Gerstein). 
53 See 318 U.S. 332, 342–47 (1943) (exposing that McNabb was detained for a period of 
fourteen hours, was not taken to a judge, and was repeatedly interrogated). 
54 See id. at 342 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 595 that states it is the responsibility of the officer who 
arrested the person charged with a crime to take that person to the nearest judicial officer 
with jurisdiction for a hearing). 
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suppression of statements that were made while a defendant was detained 
by the police before being brought before a neutral magistrate as required 
by the rule.55  Repeating its rationale from McNabb, the Court reasoned 
that “unwarranted detention led to tempting utilization of intensive 
interrogation,”56 which the Court could not sanction.57  The Court’s 
McNabb-Mallory rationale echoed in its later decisions in Gerstein and 
Riverside, since the Court reasoned that “[t]he awful instruments of the 
criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary,”58 and that 
“[l]egislation such as this, requiring that the police must with reasonable 
promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons, constitutes 
an important safeguard . . .”59 
B. Warrantless Arrests and Procedures in the Immigration System 
In the immigration system, ICE—the police, not the prosecutor—can 
arrest someone without a warrant and decide, within forty-eight hours, 
whether to issue a Notice to Appear (NTA) (the deportation system’s 
equivalent of an information)60 and whether to detain that person.61  From 
there on out, nothing has to happen quickly—in fact, a statutory provision 
that is meant to ensure ample time for detainees to obtain counsel62 
indicates that an initial master calendar hearing (the deportation system’s 
equivalent of an arraignment) should happen ten days after the NTA is 
served on the detainee.63  As a result, a person could be detained for a 
substantial period on the decision of an ICE officer.64 
                                                
55 See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451–52, 455–56 (1957) (citing Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 5(a), which requires a person making an arrest within the United States 
to take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge, or before a state 
or local judicial officer). 
56 Id. at 452–53. 
57 See id. at 455 (reversing and remanding prolonged interrogation for unnecessary delay 
in bringing petitioner before commissioner because of recognized evils in such interrogation 
techniques (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343–44, 363 (1943)). 
58 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118 (1975).  See also County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 
500 U.S. 44, 47–59 (1991) (finding county’s policy holding detainees over the weekend 
unconstitutional for exceeding forty-eight hour period of detention). 
59 McNabb, 318 U.S. at 343–44. 
60 See 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (2016) (showing that the NTA is the document that commences 
removal proceedings).  See also Riverside, 500 U.S. at 57–59 (finding detentions without a 
warrant exceeded the constitutional limit of forty-eight hours). 
61 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2016) (outlining custody proceedings for noncitizens arrested 
without a warrant and detention procedures and exceptions). 
62 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (2012) (permitting noncitizen time to secure counsel). 
63 See id. (delaying the hearing provides an opportunity for the detainee to secure counsel). 
64 See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 106 (“As a result [of Florida courts’ interpretation of the state’s 
criminal procedure laws], a person charged by information could be detained for a 
substantial period solely on the decision of a prosecutor.”). 
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The statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a), outlines ICE’s power without a 
warrant, which, among other powers,65 includes the power: 
[T]o arrest any alien who in his presence or view is 
entering or attempting to enter the United States in 
violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance of 
law regulating the admission, exclusion, expulsion, or 
removal of aliens, or to arrest any alien in the United 
States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested 
is in the United States in violation of any such law or 
regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be 
obtained for his arrest, but the alien arrested shall be 
taken without unnecessary delay for examination before 
an officer of the Service having authority to examine 
aliens as to their right to enter or remain in the United 
States.66 
ICE officers thus can make warrantless arrests and refer the case first to an 
“officer of the Service having authority to examine aliens” and then to an 
immigration judge.67 
One immigration regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d), requires ICE to make 
two decisions within forty-eight hours of arrest (except when there are 
emergency or extraordinary circumstances):  (1) whether to issue a NTA; 
and (2) whether to release the person on bond.68  The NTA is issued once 
                                                
65 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1)–(3) (2012) (giving immigration officers the power to make 
warrantless interrogations of immigrants).  For example, ICE may: without a warrant, 
interrogate a noncitizen “believed to be an alien” about his or her right to remain in the 
United States; arrest a noncitizen who in the officer’s presence or view is entering or 
attempting to enter the United States in violation of the law; board vessels or vehicles near 
the border for the purpose of patrolling the border; and make arrests for immigration law-
related felonies or other felonies cognizable under the laws of the United States if there’s a 
likelihood of escape before a warrant can be obtained.  Id. 
66 Id. 
67 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(b) (2016).  If “there is prima facie evidence that the arrested [noncitizen] 
was entering, attempting to enter, or is present in the United States in violation of the 
immigration laws, the examining officer will refer the case to an immigration judge for 
further inquiry . . . , order the [noncitizen] removed as provided for in section 235(b)(1) of 
the Act and § 235.3(b) of this chapter, or take whatever other action may be appropriate or 
required under the laws or regulations applicable to the particular case.”  Id. 
68 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2016) (laying out the custody procedures for noncitizens’ 
warrantless arrest).  This forty-eight hour rule was created in 1997, following the passage of 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and originally 
required these decisions to be made within twenty-four hours.  See Inspection and Expedited 
Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; 
Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed Reg. 10312, 10390 (1997) (inserting 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) without 
discussion).  Following the September 11, 2011 attacks, the regulation was amended, without 
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an ICE officer has confirmed the existence of prima facie evidence for 
removal.69  The regulation requires that it be a different ICE officer (not 
the arresting officer) who makes the prima facie evidence determination, 
although “[i]f no other qualified officer is readily available and the taking 
of the alien before another officer would entail unnecessary delay, the 
arresting officer, if the conduct of such examination is a part of the duties 
assigned to him or her, may examine the alien.”70  Notice that this 
regulation makes no provision for review of these important decisions by 
an independent immigration judge.71  Rather, the regulation specifically 
does not require that the examining officer be an immigration judge, 
because the regulation later makes reference to an immigration judge.72  
This regulation allows ICE—the police, not the prosecutor—to make the 
                                                
comment, to expand the time frame from twenty-four hours to forty-eight hours, but to 
include a provision allowing for this timeline to be extended “in the event of an emergency 
or other extraordinary circumstance in which case a determination will be made within an 
additional reasonable period of time.”  66 Fed. Reg. 48334, 48335 (2001).  Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia has critiqued the DOJ for failing to define “emergency,” “extraordinary 
circumstance,” or “additional reasonable period of time.”  Wadhia, supra note 4, at 874.  
Professor Wadhia describes how Asa Hutchison, then Undersecretary of Border and 
Transportation Security, in 2004 responded to criticism of this regulation by issuing a policy 
directing that during non-emergencies, detained noncitizens should be charged within forty-
eight hours of their arrest and served with an NTA within seventy-two hours of such arrest.  
Id. 874–76 (citing Memorandum from Asa Hutchison, Undersecretary, Border and 
Transportation Security, to Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement and Robert Bonner, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (Mar. 30, 2004)).  See also Immigrant Rights Clinic, New York University, Indefinite 
Detention Without Probable Cause:  A Comment on INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. § 287.3, 26 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397, 398 (2000–01) (critiquing new rule as providing no definition of 
“emergency” or “extraordinary circumstances,” nor any explanation of how long an 
“additional reasonable period” of detention may be). 
69 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(a)–(b) (2016) (detailing the examination and determination of 
proceedings for noncitizens arrested without warrants). 
70 Id. 
71 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2016) (“Unless voluntary departure has been granted pursuant 
to subpart C of 8 CFR part 240, a determination will be made within forty-eight hours of the 
arrest, except in the event of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance in which 
case a determination will be made within an additional reasonable period of time, whether 
the alien will be continued in custody or released on bond or recognizance and whether a 
notice to appear and warrant of arrest as prescribed in 8 CFR parts 236 and 239 will be 
issued.”). 
72 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(b) (2016) (“If the examining officer is satisfied that there is prima 
facie evidence that the arrested alien was entering, attempting to enter, or is present in the 
United States in violation of the immigration laws, the examining officer will refer the case to 
an immigration judge for further inquiry in accordance with 8 CFR parts 235, 239, or 240, order 
the alien removed as provided for in section 235(b)(1) of the Act and § 235.3(b) of this chapter, 
or take whatever other action may be appropriate or required under the laws or regulations 
applicable to the particular case.” (emphasis added)). 
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determination of removability and gives discretion to ICE to make the first 
detention decision.73 
The statute requires that ten days lapse between the service of the 
NTA, which details (in English) why someone is removable from the 
United States and contains notification of certain rights and 
responsibilities,74 and the first master calendar hearing, so that the 
noncitizen can obtain counsel.75  The statute also states that “[i]n the case 
of an alien who is convicted of an offense which makes the alien 
deportable, the Attorney General shall begin any removal proceeding as 
expeditiously as possible after the date of the conviction.”76  However, this 
section hardly speaks to the speed at which someone should be brought 
before a judge.77 
An example is helpful to explain what sorts of delays may occur 
before ICE must prove that a noncitizen is actually deportable for a 
                                                
73 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(a)–(b) (allowing an officer to examine and use discretion to order 
removal).  See also Hernández, supra note 5, at 882 (comparing criminal justice and 
immigration process, where the government can “merely lodge an accusation that a person 
has violated the law”). 
74 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012) (stating the specification for a NTA).  An NTA must 
specify: 
(A)  The nature of the proceedings against the [noncitizen][;] (B)  The 
legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted[;] (C)  The 
acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law[;] (D)  The charges 
against the alien and the statutory provisions alleged to have been 
violated[;] (E)  [That the noncitizen] may be represented by counsel and 
the alien will be provided (i) a period of time to secure counsel under 
subsection (b)(1) and (ii) a current list of [legal services;] (F)(i)  The 
requirement that the [noncitizen] must immediately provide (or have 
provided) the Attorney General with a written record of an address and 
telephone number (if any) at which the alien may be contacted 
respecting [removal] proceedings[;] (ii)  The requirement that the 
[noncitizen] must provide the Attorney General immediately with a 
written record of any change of the alien’s address or telephone 
number[;] (iii)  The consequences under section 1229a(b)(5)…of failure 
to provide address and telephone information pursuant to this 
subparagraph; (G) (i)  The time and place at which the proceedings will 
be held[; and] (ii)  The consequences under section 8 USCS § 1229a(b)(5) 
of the failure, except under exceptional circumstances, to appear at such 
proceedings. 
Id. 
75 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (“In order that an alien be permitted the opportunity to secure 
counsel before the first hearing date in proceedings under section [240 8 U.S.C.S. §] 
1229a . . . the hearing date shall not be scheduled earlier than ten days after the service of the 
notice to appear, unless the alien requests in writing an earlier hearing date.”). 
76 8 U.S.C. § 1229(d)(1) (2012). 
77 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(d)(2) (2012) (“Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to create 
any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against 
the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person.”). 
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criminal conviction.78  Carlos,79 a lawful permanent resident from the 
Dominican Republic, was detained on August 14 and was issued a NTA 
that charged him as removable for two crimes involving moral 
turpitude.80  After being detained for a few weeks (the statute requires at 
least ten days so he can get a lawyer),81 he appears before a neutral 
immigration judge, who gives him a few continuances to find a lawyer.82  
On September 16, he finally has a pro bono lawyer to enter an appearance 
on his behalf.83  Once Carlos obtains counsel, his counsel writes a motion 
to terminate removal proceedings, arguing that at least one of his 
convictions is not a “crime involving moral turpitude” and therefore he is 
not deportable at all.84  On October 7, ICE withdraws that charge of 
removability, and issues another, claiming he is also removable for a crime 
of domestic violence.85  His counsel files another motion to terminate 
based on the new charges, and the judge, after allowing time for both sides 
to brief the issue, on November 4 finds him removable and begins the 
process of taking applications for relief from removal.86  It is almost 
                                                
78 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (enumerating status violations and crimes that 
place noncitizens in classes qualifying them as deportable). 
79 The case details and timeline are taken from the case of a client represented by the 
Boston College Immigration Clinic.  The client’s name and country of origin has been 
changed, however, to protect his privacy. 
80 See Mot. Terminate Proceedings 3:2–5 (reflecting the Author’s experience, and a 
redacted version of this motion is on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review).  See, e.g., 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (showing that a noncitizen with multiple criminal 
convictions is deportable). 
81 See Notice to Appear 2:4–6 (Aug. 1, 2007) (illustrating the Author’s experience, and a 
redacted version of this motion is on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review).  See, e.g., 
8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (2012) (providing a noncitizen the opportunity to secure counsel). 
82 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2016) (permitting an immigration judge upon on a good cause 
showing to grant a continuance). 
83 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (2012) (prolonging the procedural process so a noncitizen can 
secure counsel). 
84 See Mot. Terminate Proceedings 5–6, 8–11 (showing the Author’s experience, and a 
redacted version of this motion is on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review).  See, e.g., 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012) (classifying noncitizen “convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude” as deportable). 
85 See Additional Charges of Inadmissibility/Deportability 1–3 (Oct. 1, 2015) (detailing the 
Author’s experience, and a redacted version of this motion is on file with the Valparaiso 
University Law Review).  See also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012) (enumerating that 
noncitizens convicted of domestic violence crimes are deportable).  At any time during the 
removal proceedings, DHS may amend the notice to appear; 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e) (2016) 
(explaining additional charges may be lodged against a noncitizen at any time during the 
proceeding). 
86 See Mot. Terminate Proceedings 17–31; Order to Terminate 1–7 (reflecting the Author’s 
experience, and a redacted version of this motion is on file with the Valparaiso University Law 
Review).  See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2012) (beginning procedures to remove deportable 
noncitizen). 
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thirteen weeks between when he is detained and when the judge decides 
that he is actually removable (which is what justifies his detention).87 
Detention decisions happen in tandem with these removability 
decisions and begin with ICE.88  The regulations permit any ICE officer 
who has arrest authority to conduct an initial custody review.89  In this 
review, thanks to a 1997 regulation that I have critiqued elsewhere,90 the 
detainee bears the burden of proving to the ICE officer that he is not a 
danger or a flight risk.91  There is an opportunity for de novo review of 
ICE’s detention decision by a neutral immigration judge.92  Frequently, the 
first opportunity that a detainee has for a neutral judge to review ICE’s 
decision to detain is at a bond hearing.93  But as I have noted elsewhere, 
that bond hearing is hardly the model vindication of procedural rights, as 
the detainee bears the burden of proving he is not a danger or a flight 
risk,94 and judges routinely rely on unreliable hearsay evidence such as 
police reports to prove dangerousness.95  In cases where there are any 
prior criminal arrests, the central question at the bond hearing becomes 
                                                
87 See Kagan, supra note 6, at 163 (referencing a confidential case where a lawful 
permanent resident was detained for two and a half months based on a legally baseless 
arrest). 
88 See generally 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (2016) (outlining procedures from the time the officer issues 
a warrant through detention and the various aspects of a particular case being analyzed 
simultaneously). 
89 See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2016) (“Any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, 
in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not described in section 236(c)(1) of the Act, under 
the conditions at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided that the alien must 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to 
property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.  Such 
an officer may also, in the exercise of discretion, release an alien in deportation proceedings 
pursuant to the authority in section 242 of the Act (as designated before April 1, 1997), except 
as otherwise provided by law.”). 
90 See Mary Holper, The Beast of Burden in Immigration Bond Hearings, 67 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 75, 90–91 (2016) (pointing out flaws in the regulation and the explanation provided by 
INS). 
91 Compare Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 90, at 90–91, with 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2016) 
(allowing an officer to use discretion to release a noncitizen detainee if the noncitizen satisfies 
the burden showing that noncitizen is not a danger). 
92 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (a), (b), (f) (2016) (permitting review by an immigration judge and 
appeal of the immigration judge’s custody decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals). 
93 See De La Cruz, 20 I. & N. Dec. 346, 359–60 (Heilman, J., dissenting) (“Unlike the 
criminal justice system, the initial decision to jail a person is made by the very law 
enforcement agency which ordered the arrest.  There is no impartial magistrate or judge 
involved at that stage.  The [bond] hearing before the immigration judge offers the first 
opportunity for an alien to appear before an impartial trier of fact.”). 
94 See generally Holper, supra note 90, at 76, 105–06, 109, 111, 117–19, 122–30 (detailing the 
noncitizen’s burden to prove that flight is not an issue). 
95 See Holper, supra note 2, at 678 nn.11 & 16, 679 n.23, 682 n.35 (citing multiple personal 
experiences where an immigration judge deferred to the police report on file). 
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whether this person is a danger to the community.96  Flight risk is a 
secondary concern; only after a detainee has passed the hurdle of proving 
non-dangerousness may the judge consider whether the detainee will 
come back to court.97 
Even if all of this happens quickly—ICE writes the NTA, charging 
removability; ICE makes an initial detention decision; the immigration 
judge holds an initial master calendar hearing—the government still never 
has to justify detention to anyone.98  Recall that the burden of proof is on 
the detainee, not the government, at that bond hearing where a neutral 
judge first considers whether to continue detention.99  That means that 
there will necessarily be delays before this bond hearing happens.  What 
sorts of delays are typical?100 
Juan, within two days of arrest, was issued a NTA and a Notice of 
Custody Determination, which said he will be detained without bond.101  
Because he had no lawyer, he did not want to sign anything, so he did not 
sign the form asking for a quick hearing.102  The statutorily-required ten 
days went by before he saw an immigration judge for the first time.103  He 
now sees the judge two weeks after he was arrested.104  Wishing to present 
the best possible argument to the judge but not having money to pay a 
lawyer,105 Juan asked for a continuance to find a pro bono lawyer to 
                                                
96 See Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140, 140–42 (BIA 2009) (remanding for an immigration judge 
to find if detainee with prior criminal record met burden of proof that he was not a danger 
to the community); Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 90, at 128 (“many immigration bond 
hearings begin and end with a dangerousness finding.”). 
97 See Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 90, at 128 n.258 (finding dangerousness 
necessitates a higher standard of proof than flight risk).  
98 See Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140, 140–42 (holding the detainee, not the government, has 
the burden of proof).  
99 See, e.g., Matter of Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. 791, 793 (BIA 2016) (finding a detainee at a 
custody hearing must show the immigration judge “that he is not ‘a threat to national 
security, a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk’” 
(quoting Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006)). 
100 See, e.g., Holper, supra note 2, at 678 nn.11 & 16, 679 n.23. (describing these delays using 
my own  experiences representing detainees in bond hearings before the Boston Immigration 
Court).  As director of the Boston College Immigration Clinic and faculty supervisor for the 
Boston College Immigration Law Group Bond project, my students and I have represented 
numerous detainees in their bond hearings. 
101 See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (2016) (explaining the process of issuing Notice of Custody 
Determination).  See also 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2016) (outlining the process of NTA).  
102 Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (allowing time for a noncitizen to appoint counsel).  
103 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2016) (describing when proceedings before an immigration 
judge can commence).  The detainee has a right to request a bond hearing without waiting 
for a master calendar hearing, but many pro se detainees may not realize this.  See Wadhia, 
supra note 4, at 876 (reporting the procedural timeframe is unclear to many detainees). 
104 See Wadhia, supra note 4, at 876.   
105 See generally Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation:  The Right to Appointed 
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & 
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represent him.  Although he indicated his desire to ask for a bond, the 
judge warned him that he has only one opportunity to do so,106 so Juan 
decided to wait.  Two weeks went by.  Now having the luck of finding a 
pro bono lawyer, Juan needed more time to gather evidence to disprove his 
own dangerousness and flight risk.107  Two more weeks went by.108  Juan’s 
counsel, having scrambled for two weeks to gather evidence, appeared at 
the hearing with a packet of supporting letters.109  The government 
attorney said she needed time to read such a large packet.110  Another 
week went by.111  The government, not being required to provide any 
evidence to Juan’s counsel ahead of time,112 submitted a large packet to 
the judge at the hearing, which contained harmful evidence that Juan’s 
counsel had not yet seen.113  Juan’s counsel, wishing to review this 
information with her client and not wishing for the judge to be reading it 
during her entire bond argument, requested a continuance.114  One more 
week went by.  Ten weeks after Juan was first detained, a neutral judge 
finally decided whether he should be released on bond. 
Does this long period of time before which detention is reviewed by a 
neutral judge not violate the Fourth Amendment’s right to a prompt 
                                                
L. 63, 121 (2012) (arguing for limited right to court-appointed counsel for Joseph hearings, in 
which it is determined whether the detainee is properly included within a mandatory 
detention category). 
106 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e) (2016) (“After an initial bond redetermination, an alien’s 
request for a subsequent bond redetermination shall be made in writing and shall be 
considered only upon a showing that the alien’s circumstances have changed materially 
since the prior bond redetermination.”). 
107 See, e.g., Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140, 141 (BIA 2009) (demonstrating the burden remains 
on the detainee to overcome presumptions of dangerousness and flight risk).  
108 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (2012) (allowing noncitizens time to secure counsel before 
beginning procedures). 
109 This reflects the Author’s personal experiences.  See, e.g., Castaneda v. Aitken, 2015 WL 
3882755, at * 2 (N. D. Ca. June 23, 2015) (describing bond support packet, which included “28 
letters of support from family and community members, proof of enrollment in a 90-day 
inpatient rehabilitation program, and testified that he had been sober in detention for close 
to nine months”).  
110 This reflects the Author’s personal experiences.  See, e.g., Basua, 3 OCAHO no. 547, 1442, 
1444–45 (1993) (requesting extension of time to respond to packet of documents submitted 
as supporting evidence). 
111 This reflects the Author’s personal experiences.  See, e.g., Basua, 3 OCAHO no. 547, 1442, 
1445 (1993) (allowing one week before issuing order).  
112 See generally Geoffrey Heeren, Shattering the One-Way Mirror Discovery in Immigration 
Court, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1569, 1571 (2014) (critiquing the vast disparity in information-
gathering, because “[i]n contrast to DHS’s formidable information-gathering powers, non-
citizens in removal cases have few discovery options.”).  
113 See, e.g., Casteneda, 2015 WL 3882755, at *2 (citing government submitting police 
reports). 
114 See id. (requesting a continuance to review documents submitted by a government 
agency against a defendant in an immigration case). 
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review of detention by a neutral judge?115  In this next section, I seek to 
explain this disparity in rights when one travels between the criminal 
justice and immigration systems.116 
III.  COURT CHALLENGES TO IMMIGRATION DETAINEE’S LACK OF PROMPT 
PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING 
Why do Fourth Amendment protections not come into play in the 
immigration context in the same manner as they are applied in the 
criminal context?117  The very short, easy answer to that question is that 
immigration law is civil, not criminal.118  In the facetious words of Dan 
Kanstroom, “they are not being punished, they are simply being 
regulated.”119  Because deportation is not punishment, Fourth 
Amendment rights and remedies can appear quite watered down.120  For 
example, the Supreme Court, in its 1984 decision in INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza,121 refused to apply the exclusionary rule to the deportation 
context, finding that it would only apply for egregious violations.122  The 
Court justified this limited availability of Fourth Amendment remedies 
because deportation was civil.123 
                                                
115 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
mandates a judicial determination of probable cause by a neutral judge before a suspect may 
be detained for an extended period of time). 
116 See Chacón, supra note 2, at 1604–05 (discussing the disparity in rights between criminal 
and civil proceedings under the Fourth Amendment). 
117 See id. (identifying how different provisions of the Fourth Amendment provide 
different protections in the criminal sphere versus the civil sphere). 
118 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (holding that deportation is 
not punishment). 
119 See Kanstroom, supra note 11, at 1895 (discussing how deportation is not classified as 
punishment because it is a civil penalty rather than a criminal one).  In a presentation I gave 
to a group of students from my law school’s prosecution and defense clinics, they were 
surprised to hear that immigration, especially immigration detention, was considered 
“civil,” especially after I described to them how immigration detainees are held in local jails, 
subject to the exact same restraints as the rest of the criminal justice population. 
120 See Holper, supra note 2, at 708 (“[i]mmigration law has seen all procedural protections 
either guaranteed by statute, or, to the extent they are imposed constitutionally, filtered 
through the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause where “fundamental fairness” dictates 
whether a certain procedure is necessary. The “fundamental fairness” test has led to a 
watering down of the protections available in a criminal case.”); Chacón, supra note 2, at 
1604–05 (discussing the limited Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections that apply in the 
immigration, as opposed to the criminal, context). 
121 See 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (discussing the necessity for detention to prevent an 
individual facing deportation from taking retaliatory action). 
122 Id. at 1050–51. 
123 See id. at 1041–50 (applying test from United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)). 
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Detention is seen as a necessary part of the deportation process, which 
itself is civil.124  As European immigration law scholar Daniel Wilshire has 
noted, during the early debates of the U.S. government’s right to exclude 
and expel noncitizens, “detention had never been separately considered 
from the issue of expulsion,” which “proved to be a crucial omission” 
because of the “distinct legal and moral concerns” raised by detention.125  
So, the lack of a prompt probable cause hearing is yet another place where 
detention—because it is embedded within the “civil” deportation 
process—takes on the legal character of that process, without truly 
examining the legal concerns with the detention itself.126  Appellate court 
judges and Supreme Court justices, unfortunately writing in dissents, 
have made this very critique.127  In the words of Justice Brennan, 
dissenting in the 1960 case Abel v. United States: 
Even assuming that the power of Congress over aliens 
may be as great as was said in Galvan v. Press, . . . and that 
deportation may be styled “civil,” . . . it does not follow 
                                                
124 See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (explaining how, without detention, 
aliens could harm the United States during deportation proceedings); Wong Wing v. United 
States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (examining the potential harm aliens could cause during the 
deportation process if detention was not allowed). 
125 DANIEL WILSHIRE, IMMIGRATION DETENTION:  LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS, 6 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2012). 
126 See César Cuauhtémoc & García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1358 (2014) (making formalist, rules-based argument that immigration 
detention is punishment, rooting argument in immigration detention’s legislative history);  
Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 49 (2010) 
(making functionalist critiques that immigration detention has been converted “into a quasi-
punitive regime far out of alignment with immigration custody’s permissible purposes”).  
See generally Kagan, supra note 6, at 130 (discussing the unwarranted power given to 
immigration authorities).  
127 See, e.g., Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 913 F.2d 1315, 1399 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(discussing the application of detention to deportable alien minors), vacated and superseded en 
banc 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), remanded 
to 992 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1993).  For example, in Flores, Judge Fletcher dissented from the 
panel’s decisions that unaccompanied minors in immigration detention had no right to a 
prompt probable cause hearing and wrote: 
In effect, the majority is moving from the uncontroverted propositions 
that the political branches of plenary authority over deciding whom to 
admit into the country and that such political decisions are largely 
immune from judicial review, to the unsupportable conclusion that how 
it treats those whom it detains while the deportation is underway is 
likewise beyond judicial review.  This is an unwarranted leap. 
Id. at 1339 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
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that Congress may strip aliens of the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment . . . .128 
Scholars such as César Cuauhtémoc, García Hernández, and Anil 
Kalhan have rightfully critiqued immigration detention as punishment.129  
For those who truly believe that immigration detention is not punishment, 
as the Supreme Court has held,130 I wonder whether they have ever spent 
the day at one of the many other jails where ICE holds people and met 
with those who are in immigration detention.131  If, after that, they still 
consider this detention as “civil,” then I welcome the conversation.132  For 
the moment, however, I leave these important critiques aside; rather, I 
wish to show how this (misguided) notion that immigration detention and 
deportation are civil has caused courts to overlook a glaring Fourth 
Amendment problem, the lack of a prompt probable cause hearing for 
immigration detainees.133 
A good place to start is the Supreme Court’s 1960 decision in Abel v. 
United States.134  In Abel, the Court considered whether an arrest by 
immigration authorities pursuant to an administrative warrant should 
lead to suppression of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment.135  The 
Court found that a judicial warrant within the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment was not necessary to lawfully arrest a noncitizen for 
                                                
128 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 250 (Brennan, J., joined by Warren, J., Black, J., and 
Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954)). 
129 See supra note 126 (exploring different methods of analysis, all of which lead to the 
conclusion that detention is punishment). 
130 See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (reasoning that detention is 
merely a necessary part of the process of deportation, similar to an innocent person’s 
temporary detention after being arrested). 
131 See, e.g., Challenging Unconstitutional Conditions in CBP Detention Facilities, AM. IMMIGR. 
COUNCIL (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/litigation/ 
challenging-unconstitutional-conditions-cbp-detention-facilities [https://perma.cc/6EQU-
NP7R] (explaining typical conditions in immigration detention facilities). 
132 See Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 398 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Rodriguez-Fernandez 
v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981) (“[A]n alien whose detention occurs in a 
maximum security federal prison may be forgiven for wondering when his punishment 
stopped and detention began.”).  See also Abira Ashfaq, We Have Given Them this Power:  
Reflections of an Immigration Attorney, NEW POLITICS, Summer 2004, at 75 (“[i]t isn’t okay that 
[a detainee] was imprisoned for [two weeks] more than he should because the INS could and 
did ignore the immigration judge’s order [to release him].  I think the government trial 
attorney should have to spend two weeks in [the jail] for the mistake because incarceration 
is a big deal.”). 
133 See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537–38 (1952) (discussing how deportation is a civil 
matter). 
134 See 362 U.S. 217, 250 (1960) (illuminating the Supreme Court’s decision in this 1960 case). 
135 See id. at 230 (emphasizing that the Court’s consideration would be different if the 
evidence had established that the administrative warrant was being employed as an 
instrument of criminal law rather than deportation). 
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deportation,136 reasoning that “[s]tatutes authorizing administrative arrest 
to achieve detention pending deportation proceedings have the sanction 
of time.”137  The Court’s statements about the Fourth Amendment rights 
in the administrative arrests context was dicta, however, since the Court 
repeatedly stated that the petitioner had waived the issue by not raising it 
in prior stages of the litigation.138  Thus, Abel, while problematic in its 
dicta,139 is not a case where the issue of a prompt probable cause hearing 
actually was decided.140 
Circuit courts considering the issue of whether immigration detainees 
have a right to a prompt probable cause hearing have decided that the 
“decision to issue the NTA is the constitutional equivalent of a finding of 
probable cause by a magistrate.”141  Judge Posner’s opinion in the 1982 
case Arias v. Rogers is of particular interest.142  Considering a challenge to 
the arrest without warrant procedures of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) (the precursor to ICE),143 Judge Posner 
observed that the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), requires “that an alien 
                                                
136 See id. at 232 (interpreting the language of the statute authorizing administrative arrest). 
137 Id. at 230. 
138 See Abel, 362 U.S. at 230 (“The claim that the administrative warrant by which petitioner 
was arrested was invalid, because it did not satisfy the requirements for ‘warrants’ under the 
Fourth Amendment, is not entitled to our consideration in the circumstances before us.  It 
was not made below; indeed, it was expressly disavowed.”).  The court went to state that the 
petition “did not challenge the exercise of [the warrant] authority below, but expressly 
acknowledged its validity.  Id. at 231.  The court further explained that “[a]t no time did 
petitioner question the legality of the administrative arrest procedure either as unauthorized 
or unconstitutional.  Such challenges were, to repeat, disclaimed.”  Id.  As a result, the court 
concluded that “[a]ffirmative acceptance of what is now sought to be questioned could not 
be plainer.”  Id. at 232. 
139 See id. at 246 (Douglas, J., and Black, J., dissenting) (“The tragedy in our approval of 
these short cuts is that the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment is removed from 
an important segment of our life.”). 
140 See Kagan, supra note 6, at 127 (discussing the constitutional problems inherent in the 
ICE’s procedure to arrest immigrants without warrants or probable cause hearings). 
141 See Min-Shey Hung v. United States, 617 F.2d 201, 202 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding 
examination by authorized INS officer “basically the same as a criminal proceeding before a 
magistrate on probable cause” and “sufficient to meet the constitutional standards and to 
commence the deportation proceedings.”); Salgado v. Scannel, 561 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 
1977) (“Salgado now argues that his May 18 affidavit [which was taken after INS arrested 
him] should have been suppressed because he was arrested without a warrant and was not 
taken before a magistrate.  We find no merit in this contention.  Under the express authority 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) and (2), the warrantless arrest 
was legal.”).  Cf. United States v. Encarnacion, 239 F.3d 395, 400 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which requires a prompt probable cause hearing, 
does not protect detainees arrested for deportation under 1357(a)(2)). 
142 See 676 F.2d 1139, 1141 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing the applicability of habeas corpus to 
detention once deportation proceedings have begun). 
143 See infra note 150 (detailing change from INS to ICE). 
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arrested without a warrant ‘be taken without unnecessary delay before an 
officer of the Service having authority to examine aliens as to their right to 
enter or remain in the United States.’”144  He wrote that “[t]he reference is 
to a special inquiry officer, also called an immigration judge. . . [s]pecial 
inquiry officers have judicial authority . . . and therefore correspond to the 
committing magistrate in a criminal proceeding.”145  Posner also observed: 
The statute and regulations do not define the authority of 
the special inquiry officer when an alien who has been 
arrested without a warrant pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(a)(2) is brought before him.  But we assume (and 
perhaps 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 implies) that he has the same 
authority that a committing magistrate would have, and 
that the special inquiry officer is explicitly given in 8 
C.F.R. § 242.2(b) when the arrest is pursuant to a warrant, 
to order the release of one who is detained illegally.146 
Posner appears to have been mistaken, as the Ninth Circuit later 
pointed out.147  This confusion is understandable, given that he was 
writing this passage one year before the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (EOIR) was created.  In 1983, the EOIR finally divorced the former 
INS from immigration judges, although both agencies remained within 
the Department of Justice.148  When Judge Posner referred to “special 
inquiry officers” in 1982, he was referencing the precursor to what today 
is an immigration judge (situated in a separate agency).  At the time, 
however, special inquiry officers were part of the INS, but were given 
                                                
144 See Arias, 676 F.2d at 1142 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2012)). 
145 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 242.8(a) (2017)). 
146 Id. at 1143. 
147 See Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 913 F.2d 1315, 1337 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(discussing the application of detention to deportable alien minors), vacated and superseded en 
banc 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), remanded 
to 992 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1993).  In the panel opinion in Flores, the Ninth Circuit cited Arias as 
erroneously concluding that the examining officer mentioned in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) was an 
immigration judge rather than an INS official.  Flores, 913 F.2d at 1337 (citing Arias v. Rogers, 
676 F.2d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir.1982).  The Panel concluded that Gerstein’s “neutral and 
detached” magistrate requirement was inapplicable to deportation proceedings.  Id.  An en 
banc panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, and the Supreme Court reversed the 
Ninth Circuit.  Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1990), en banc, 
rev’d sub nom. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
148 See Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 INTERP. REL. 453–59 (1988), 
reprinted in STEPHEN E. LEGOMSKY AND CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND 
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, Sixth Ed. 686, 686 (2015) (chronicling the history of the separation 
of functions between the INS and what ultimately became IJs under the newly-created EOIR 
in 1983). 
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separate files than the INS prosecutors.149  With the changes that created 
EOIR in 1983, immigration judges were never given the responsibility of 
issuing or affirming the charging document.  That responsibility stayed 
with the INS.150 
The issue of whether noncitizen juveniles who were in INS custody 
had the right to a prompt probable cause hearing before a neutral judge 
was an issue in litigation that began in the Ninth Circuit in the 1980s.151  In 
Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese,152 a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed 
a district court judge’s order granting such hearings.153  The panel 
concluded that Gerstein did not apply to deportation proceedings, and that 
the Gerstein Court itself stressed that its holding was not readily 
transferrable to civil proceedings.154  The panel also followed the dicta in 
Abel, writing that although “professing not to reach the issue of whether 
an INS arrest warrant was invalid because it failed to comply with the 
fourth amendment's requirements for warrants, the Court nonetheless 
devoted five pages to rejecting petitioner’s claim.”155  An en banc panel of 
the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the children’s fundamental 
                                                
149 See id. at 689 (discussing special inquiry officers). 
150 See 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2017) (describing the power of notice to appear).  Nor were judges 
given authority to affirm probable cause when the Department of Homeland Security was 
created in 2002; rather, the authority to issue NTAs and confirm that the charges contained 
therein stayed within DHS.  See also Final Rule, Authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security; 
Delegations of Authority; Immigration Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 44, 10922, 10924 (Mar. 6, 2003) 
(showing within the Department of Homeland Security Act, Congress finally separated the 
immigration enforcement functions from the adjudication functions); Department of 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002) (depicting 
what had been INS now became ICE (responsible for detention and deportation), the 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (responsible for processing affirmative applications), 
and the Customs and Border Protection (responsible for border patrol)). The Department of 
Homeland Security Act also created the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services and 
the Bureau of Border Security and eliminating the INS.  Id.  The judges and Board of 
Immigration Appeals, within the Executive Office for Immigration Review, remained in the 
Department of Justice.  Id. at 2273–74. 
151 See Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 913 F.2d 1315, 1337 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(discussing the necessity of detention versus the protection of alien minors), vacated and 
superseded en banc 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 
(1993), remanded to 992 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1993). 
152 See id. (reasoning that the necessity of detention warranted the denial of such hearings). 
153 Id. at 1335–37. 
154 See id. at 1336 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27).  The Court remanded to the district 
court to determine whether such a hearing was appropriate under the Mathews v. Eldridge 
balancing test.  Id.  See also id. at 1337 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35). 
155 Id. at 1337 (citing Abel, 362 U.S. at 233).  See also Spinella v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 535, 
540–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“While the Supreme Court declined to pass upon a similar argument 
in Abel, . . . some pertinent observations there were nonetheless made . . . the court did refer 
to its frequent upholding of administrative deportation proceedings shown to have 
commenced by arrests made pursuant to such warrants.”). 
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liberty interest required that “the decision to detain be made only in 
conjunction with a neutral and detached determination of necessity.”156 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in 1993, in the case 
entitled Reno v. Flores.157  The Court found that there was no fundamental 
liberty interest at stake because the case dealt with INS custody of 
children, who are “always in some form of custody.”158  Thus, “shackles, 
chains, or barred cells” were not at issue, as would be the case in adult 
immigration detention.159  The Court dedicated very little of its decision 
to the procedural due process claim that the children should have their 
detention promptly reviewed for probable cause by a neutral judge.160  
Rather, the Court found that the juveniles were given ample procedures 
under the regulations.161  Nowhere in the majority opinion is Gerstein even 
mentioned.162  Because the Flores Court took great pains to ensure that it 
was not deciding about “shackles, chains, or barred cells,” the issue of 
whether adults in immigration detention can seek a Gerstein-style hearing 
was not resolved.163  Also, as Michael Kagan has noted, because the Court 
was ruling on a facial challenge to the regulation, it did not have to 
consider what would amount to “excessive delay” in holding a hearing.164 
                                                
156 Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 1991). 
157 See 507 U.S. 292, 315 (1993) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Flores). 
158 Id. at 302 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
159 Id. 
160 See id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the issue of prompt judicial review, 
which the majority opinion glossed over). 
161 See id. at 307–09 (outlining the specific procedures available to juveniles under the 
regulations). 
162 See id. (avoiding Gerstein and the implications stemming therefrom).  This is unlike the 
panel decision and the en banc decisions, which, between the majority opinions and the 
concurring and dissenting opinions, yielded much discussion about the applicability of 
Gerstein or whether a prompt probable cause hearing should be afforded to the juveniles 
under the Mathews v. Eldridge test.  See, e.g., Flores, 913 F.2d at 1335–37 (panel opinion 
discussion of applicability of Gerstein).  In dissent, Justice Fletcher stated, “the [Gerstein] 
Court reasoned that when ‘the stakes are this high,’ a determination by a neutral magistrate 
is required.  Prosecutorial judgment standing alone is not enough.”  Id. at 1348–49.  See also 
Flores, 942 F.2d at 1364–65 (en banc opinion addressing Gerstein issue); id. at 1367–69 (Tang. 
J., concurring) (discussing that under Mathews, not Gerstein, plaintiffs should have a probable 
cause hearing with a neutral judge and stating, “[o]ur Constitution has long recognized that 
combining the roles of prosecutor and adjudicator in a single entity is a recipe for 
fundamentally unfair and erroneous decision making.”); id. at 1374–75 (Rymer, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (finding that Gerstein does not apply to civil deportation 
hearings, but that “[t]ime limits and impartiality . . . are basic safeguards against arbitrary 
action.”). 
163 See Kagan, supra note 6, at 151–52 (discussing the Flores Court’s categorization of 
juvenile detention as “legal custody” and analogizing it to state orphanages). 
164 See Kagan, supra note 6, at 151–52 (noting that the Flores Court sidestepped the excessive 
delay issue entirely).  In Flores, the INS regulation challenged had been in effect only one 
week when the district court issued its judgment; before that, the INS had relied on a 1984 
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Thus, the Supreme Court has never squarely decided whether 
immigration detainees have a Fourth Amendment right to a prompt 
probable cause hearing before a neutral judge.  Perhaps the issue might be 
of renewed interest to judges,165 especially in light of the cases discussed 
in the next section.166 
IV.  TAKING ANOTHER LOOK AT PROBABLE CAUSE HEARINGS IN THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
What is different now?  Why would courts revisit the question of 
whether noncitizens have the right to a prompt review by a neutral judge 
of their detention?  Besides the political realities of the day—a Trump 
presidency with its heightened focus on detention and deportation,167 
Jennifer Chacón answered this in a 2010 article, writing that “[s]everal 
legal and demographic trends are converging that create a renewed need 
to examine the procedural protections that apply in the context of 
immigration law enforcement.”168  She notes that immigration 
enforcement is on the rise, a growing number of noncitizens are 
potentially subject to ICE jurisdiction, and local, state, and federal law 
enforcement officers are increasingly using immigration law as a means 
of achieving criminal law enforcement goals.169  She notes that “[g]rowing 
evidence suggests that these gaps between the rights and remedies 
available to noncitizens in removal proceedings and those available to 
noncitizens in criminal proceedings have encouraged more aggressive 
forms of policing in immigrant communities.”170 
                                                
policy that was codified in the regulation.  Flores, 507 U.S. at 295–97, 300.  The Court reasoned 
that to prevail in such a facial challenge, the children “must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the [regulation] would be valid.”  Id. at 301 (quoting 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). 
165 Cf. Gordon v. Johnson, 300 F.R.D. 31, 42 (D. Mass. 2014) (finding concerns with “the 
procedures used to effectuate the requirements of section 1226(a) [governing detention and 
bond hearings in immigration court]–specifically the time between detention and a bail 
hearing as well as the ability of a detainee to ensure his or her request for a hearing makes 
its way to an Immigration official . . . ”). 
166 See infra Part III (discussing probable cause hearings in the immigration system). 
167 See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text (examining President Trump’s strong 
push to detain and deport aliens, particularly ones who have committed crimes); infra note 
261 and accompanying text (describing Trump’s effort to fast-track deportation 
proceedings). 
168 Chacón, supra note 2, at 1622. 
169 See Chacón, supra note 2, at 1622 (describing the current trend in immigration 
enforcement). 
170 Chacón, supra note 2, at 1622–23. 
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Developments in Supreme Court case law could cause courts to take 
a second look at this issue.171  Also, the successful ICE detainer litigation, 
such as the cases discussed below, has caused courts to show a renewed 
interest in the lack of a prompt probable cause hearing when someone is 
arrested for deportation.172 
A. Padilla v. Kentucky:  Rethinking Deportation as Civil 
Courts should take another look at this issue now because in 2010, in 
Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court called into question the 
categorization of deportation as civil, thus raising new questions about 
whether the Fourth Amendment should apply to deportation 
proceedings.173  On its face, Padilla appears to be a simple holding about 
defense counsel’s duty to advise noncitizen defendants about deportation 
consequences.174  However, to reach that holding, the Court made 
significant headway into reclassifying deportation as punishment.175  For 
example, the Court stated that:  “deportation is an integral part—indeed, 
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed 
on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”176  The 
Court explained this after discussing how “[o]ur law has enmeshed 
criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a 
century,”177 and it is “‘most difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the 
conviction in the deportation context.”178  The Court seemed to waffle 
between calling deportation civil or criminal.  Repeating the time-honored 
passage that deportation is not punishment for a crime, the Court then 
                                                
171 See id. at 1568–69 (articulating the Supreme Court decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza 
related to a deportation hearing). 
172 See generally Kagan, supra note 6, at 127 (discussing how warrantless arrests are the 
norm in Immigration law enforcement and there is not immediate probable cause finding 
either). 
173 See 559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010) (bringing into question deportation and whether it 
should be considered civil or criminal in nature); Kanstroom, supra note 14, at 1472 
(analyzing deportation, the Padilla case, and the consequences brought about by Padilla on 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourth Amendment protections).  See also Peter Markowitz, Deportation is 
Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1314–15 (2011) (providing that the Fourth Amendment 
should apply to cases of deportation). 
174 See 559 U.S. at 374 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)) (“[i]t is our 
responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant—whether a 
citizen or not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’ . . . To satisfy this 
responsibility, we now hold that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a 
risk of deportation.”). 
175 See id. at 363–64 (asserting that since deportation could be a criminal punishment, there 
has never been more importance of accurate legal advice for those facing deportation). 
176 Id. at 364. 
177 Id. at 365–66. 
178 Id. at 366. (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (1982)). 
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stated that “deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal 
process.”179  The Court ultimately refused to classify deportation as either 
civil or criminal.180  Conflating the civil-criminal distinction with the 
collateral-direct designation, the Court stated that deportation is 
“uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or collateral consequence 
[of a criminal conviction].”181 
If one thinks of deportation as “quasi-criminal,” it is easier to 
conceptualize a way in which the Fourth Amendment could apply.182  In 
a prior article, I proposed an application of the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause,183 applying Padilla to extend certain “hard-floor” 
rights available in the criminal justice system.184  Most significantly, these 
rights can attach categorically, as opposed to relying on a case-by-case 
analysis (under Mathews v. Eldridge)185 of whether the facts of a given case 
require the application of a right.186  I discuss how courts have been willing 
to extend other criminal justice rights in the deportation context,187 such 
                                                
179 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365. 
180 See id. at 365–66 (debating, but not concluding, whether or not deportation is a civil or 
a criminal matter). 
181 Id. at 357.  See also Markowitz, supra note 173, at 1338–39 (analyzing how courts tend to 
use the term “collateral consequence” as synonymous with “civil consequence” and that the 
Padilla Court conflates these two discussions). 
182 See generally Holper, Confronting Cops, supra note 2, at 721 (presenting the idea of 
conceptualizing deportation as both a criminal and civil matter). 
183 See id. at 693 (arguing that Sixth Amendment confrontation clause protections should 
be applied in removal proceedings). 
184 See id. (proposing the need for the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause protections 
to be applied to removal proceedings). See also, e.g., id. at 1499–1500 (citing Betts v. Brady, 
316 U.S. 455 (1942)) (discussing cases leading up to Gideon’s recognition of a right to counsel 
in criminal cases and stating, “[i]t would seem to be clearly wrong now to categorize all 
forms of deportation as noncriminal, nonpunitive, and collateral, and thus subjected only to 
the flexible (and frequently ineffective) due process norms à la Betts”); Markowitz, 
Deportation Is Different, supra note 173, at 1488–89 (displaying the difference between the 
criminal and civil realms and how applicable rights in the criminal realm act as a hard floor 
regardless of specific circumstances). 
185 See 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (articulating that certain “hard-floor” rights can be 
attached categorically instead of relying on a case-by-case analysis). 
186 See Holper, Confronting Cops, supra note 2, at 693 (reviewing whether the Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation applies to a civil case rather than a criminal case); 
Markowitz, Deportation is Different, supra note 173, at 1338–39 (discussing the difference 
between “hard floor” rights in the criminal realm and case-by-case rights in the civil realm, 
and advocating for a test that recognizes some deportations as quasi-criminal and therefore 
certain hard floor rights should apply). 
187 See Holper, Confronting Cops, supra note 2, at 693 (articulating that courts have been 
extending rights afforded in criminal justice proceedings to the deportation proceedings). 
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as the rule of lenity,188 principles against retroactive legislation,189 a 
heightened burden to prove deportability,190 and (a watered-down 
version of) the exclusionary rule.191  Thus, it is not a far stretch to extend 
the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of a neutral, detached magistrate to 
promptly prove the need to detain.192 
B. Zadvydas v. Davis:  Questioning the Plenary Power Doctrine 
It is also necessary to discuss why immigration law’s plenary power, 
which causes courts to avoid second-guessing the political branches in 
immigration law,193 should not govern a court’s consideration of the 
adequacy of the procedures used to determine whether probable cause 
exists to hold an immigration detainee.194  The Supreme Court has found 
                                                
188 See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (providing that the rule of lenity provides 
that if there is ambiguous language in a criminal code then the language will be construed 
in favor of the accused); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 9–10 (1948) (describing the rule 
of lenity and its applicability to deportation statutes and trials). 
189 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315–51 (2001) (focusing on principles against retroactive 
legislation). 
190 See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966)  (explaining that the Court has referred to 
the “clear, convincing, and unequivocal” standard of proof adopted by the Woodby Court in 
deportation cases as an “intermediate standard”); Brandt Distributing Co. Inc. v. Federal 
Insurance Co., 247 F. 3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing the type of standard of proof 
adopted in Woody which is generally used “in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or 
some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant.”).  See also, e.g., Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424, 432 (1979) (discussing the heightened burden to prove deportability 
and holding that in civil commitment cases, due process requires the intermediate standard 
of proof and not the criminal “proof beyond reasonable doubt” standard). 
191 See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1049–51 (1984) (describing courts 
extension of criminal justice rights in the deportation context, including the exclusionary 
rule). 
192 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (determining that the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement for probable cause should be decided by a neutral and detached 
magistrate). 
193 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 712–13 (1893) (discussing how 
allowing or excluding immigrates affects international relations and this process should be 
overseen by political departments and regulated by executive departments); Ekiu v. United 
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (stating that is a well-known and accepted adage that 
sovereign territories, such as the United States, has the power to forbid immigrants to come 
into their land); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04, 606 (1889) (reasoning 
that if the United States could not exclude noncitizens, “it would be to that extent subject to 
the control of another power” because it could not defend itself against “vast hordes 
of . . . people crowding in upon us”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 
537, 544 (1950) (“[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far 
as an alien denied entry is concerned”). 
194 See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 760 (discussing the probable cause requirement for 
holding an immigration detainee). 
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that detention is a necessary part of the removal process;195 thus, it would 
follow that if the political branches’ decisions in the deportation process 
are not subject to second-guessing by courts, neither should their 
detention decisions be scrutinized by the judiciary.196  However, as David 
Cole has noted, the Supreme Court has been careful to apply traditional 
Due Process analysis, even in the face of the plenary power, when 
considering questions of detention.197 
In 2001, in Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a statute that the INS interpreted to permit indefinite 
detention of noncitizens who were ordered removed, but remained 
indefinitely detained because they were either stateless or their 
governments refused to repatriate them.198  The Court resolved the 
constitutional issue by avoiding it, instead interpreting the post-order 
custody review statute as not permitting detention beyond six months.199  
However, the Court’s rhetoric about the constitutionality of immigration 
detention suggested that it would require the government to provide 
special justification for its immigration detention decisions, as it had 
required of the government in other civil detention contexts.200  Most 
importantly, the Court stated that the plenary power is “subject to 
important constitutional limitations.”201  Michael Kagan acknowledges 
that Zadvydas concerned immigration detention at the “back end” (when 
the noncitizen had been detained for a while), instead of questioning the 
                                                
195 See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (articulating the necessity for detention 
to be a part of the deportation process); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) 
(agreeing that there is a necessity for detention within the deportation process). 
196 See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 534 (reasoning that even lawful permanent residents “remain 
subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under the sovereign right to 
determine what noncitizens shall be permitted to remain within our borders”); id. at 538 
(“[d]etention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure.  Otherwise aliens arrested 
for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States during the pendency of 
deportation proceedings.”). 
197 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (“[t]hat [plenary] power is subject to important 
constitutional limitations.”).  See also David Cole, In Aid of Removal:  Due Process Limits on 
Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1038 (2002) (arguing that defenders of unchecked 
detention as part of the deportation process “have confused the power to deport with the 
power to detain”); id. at 1016 (“at the very height of deference to plenary immigration power, 
the Court in Wong Wing applied to immigration detention the same principle that it has 
subsequently applied in other civil detention cases:  an absolute prohibition of the use of civil 
detention for punitive ends” (citing Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 228)). 
198 See id. at 684. 
199 See id. at 699–701 (interpreting the post-order custody review statute). 
200 See Cole, supra note 197, at 1017–21 (suggesting that the Court would require the 
government to provide special justification for its immigration detention decisions); 
Margaret Taylor, Demore v. Kim:  Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly 364, in IMMIGRATION 
STORIES (Foundation Press 2005). 
201 Taylor, supra note 200, at 695. 
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initial decision to detain.202  However, the Court’s decision in Zadvydas 
marks a turning point in the doctrine, where the Court was willing to 
recognize that there is something different about immigration detention 
that causes the plenary power to lose its force where it otherwise might 
apply to block courts’ considerations of immigration questions.203 
At first glance, the Court’s next immigration detention decision after 
Zadvydas, its 2003 decision in Demore v. Kim,204 appears to foreclose a Due 
Process challenge to the lack of a prompt probable cause hearing.205  In 
Demore, the Court considered a Due Process challenge to mandatory 
detention without an individualized hearing on flight risk and 
dangerousness.206  Mr. Kim was a LPR who was deportable for two 
“crimes involving moral turpitude,” which under the mandatory 
detention statute meant that an immigration judge could not consider his 
bond request.207  The Court held that these procedures did not violate Due 
Process because they applied to a narrow group of those Congress deemed 
most dangerous208—those deportable for certain types of crimes, 
including aggravated felonies209—and detention was brief.210 
                                                
202 See Kagan, supra note 6, at 129–30. 
203 See id. at 142–44 (articulating that the decision in Zadvydas was a turning point in 
immigration decisions, ruling that there is something different about immigration detention 
making the plenary authority lose its power when it might otherwise apply).  See also 
Immigrants Rights Clinic, New York University, supra note 68, at 418–19, 419 n. 104 (noting 
Congress’s plenary power over aliens, but addressing “whether Congress has chosen a 
constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power” by engaging in due process 
review (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41 (1983))). 
204 See 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (reviewing issues regarding immigration detention for the 
first time after Zadvydas). 
205 See id. at 526–27, 531 (illustrating that instead the Due Process challenge to prompt bond 
hearing is quashed). 
206 See id. at 514 (questioning the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 under the Due Process 
Clause). 
207 See id. at 513, 513 n.1 (defining crimes that involve “moral turpitude”). 
208 See id. at 518–21 (relying on Congressional reports that allowed for legislative 
presumption of dangerousness and flight risk).  See also id. at 524–25 (holding that the Due 
Process clause was not violated because the statute applied to a select group of dangerous 
individuals). 
209 Mandatory detention applies to noncitizens deportable for firearms, aggravated 
felonies, crimes involving moral turpitude, terrorism or security reasons, and noncitizens 
who are inadmissible for any criminal reasons.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).  Although the term 
“aggravated felony” sounds sinister, in reality the term is quite all-encompassing, having 
been described as “colossus” after “a series of amendments have added crime after crime to 
the list.”  Id.  See also Legomsky, Asymmetric Norms, supra note 1, at 484; Peter Markowitz, 
Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide:  A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of 
Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R-C.L. REV. 289, 340 (2008) (“[t]he definition of aggravated 
felony has been expanded to sweep so broadly that now a crime does not need to be either 
aggravated or a felony to fall within the statutory definition of ‘aggravated felony.’”). 
210 Writing to uphold mandatory detention in Demore, Justice Rehnquist cited statistics that 
led the Court to believe that a typical removal hearing where the person is in detention “lasts 
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However, the mandatory detention statute in Demore narrowly 
withstood a Due Process challenge,211 and that was only because the fifth 
vote, Justice Kennedy, believed that there was in fact an individualized 
review by an immigration judge of the legality of the detention.212  Mr. 
Kim could have asked an immigration judge to review whether he was 
properly included in the mandatory detention statute.213  An immigration 
judge, in what is referred to as a Joseph hearing (named after the Board’s 
decision authorizing such hearing),214 can review whether a detainee has 
                                                
roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about 
five months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.”  See Demore, 538 
U.S. at 530.  The Department of Justice recently wrote a letter to the Court explaining that 
these statistics were incorrect; mandatory detention for detainees who appeal their cases 
actually lasted twelve months in the average case at the time the government presented these 
statistics.  Id.  See also Letter from Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor General, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to the Honorable Scott Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States (Aug. 26, 
2016) http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Demore.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S98W-45AH]. 
211 Scholars have been critical of the Court’s decision in Demore.  See, e.g., David Cole, Out 
of the Shadows:  Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 717 
(2009) ( “[t]he Court’s reasoning in [Demore v. Kim] is flawed, as it proffers no good reason 
for discarding the requirement of individualized need before subjecting a human being to 
preventive detention.”).  See also Taylor, supra note 200, at 345 (describing the case in terms 
of legal realism, since it was decided in a post-September 11th world, which provides a 
striking contrast to Zadvydas, which was decided before September 11, 2001). 
212 See Demore, 538 U.S. at 531–33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & 
N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999)) (describing procedures, laid out in the Board’s decision in Matter of 
Joseph, whereby a mandatory detainee can seek review by an immigration judge about 
whether he is properly included in a mandatory detention category, and stating that “due 
process requires individualized procedures to ensure there is at least some merit to the 
[INS]’s charge and, therefore, sufficient justification to detain a lawful permanent resident 
alien pending a more formal hearing”).  See also Demore, 538 U.S. at 515 n.3 (“[b]ecause 
respondent conceded that he was deportable because of a conviction that triggers § 1226(c) 
and thus sought no Joseph hearing, we have no occasion to review the adequacy of Joseph 
hearings generally in screening out those who are improperly detained pursuant to 
§ 1226(c).”).  Justice Kennedy also focused on the short length of detention, noting that “a 
lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized 
determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became 
unreasonable or unjustified.”  Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 
Zadyvdas, 533 U.S. at 684–86); Cole, Preventive Detention, supra note 224, at 717 (describing 
Demore as an outlier for upholding preventive detention without the usual showing 
necessary, but that “even there the crucial fifth vote stressed the importance of some kind of 
individualized determination”). 
213 See Demore, 538 U.S. at 531 (articulating that Mr. Kim had the option to ask the 
immigration judge to review that appropriateness of being included in the mandatory 
detention statute). 
214 See Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 809 (BIA 1999) (ruling in a “Joseph” hearing, 
which is named after the Board’s decision authorizing the decision to be made). 
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been properly charged as an aggravated felon, and thus subject to 
mandatory detention.215 
Because the Demore Court assumed that Mr. Kim had foregone the 
right to ask for a Joseph hearing, the Court did not consider any 
constitutional challenges to such a hearing.216  Following Demore, courts 
and scholars have criticized these hearings.217  Namely, the detainee must 
request it (as opposed to it being automatically provided, unlike a 
probable cause hearing);218 there is no timeline by which it must happen 
(again, unlike the probable cause hearing, which must occur within forty-
eight hours for criminal detention and seventy-two hours for civil 
detention);219 and there is an incredibly high standard of proof, requiring 
the detainee to bear the burden of proving that DHS is “substantially 
unlikely to prevail” on their ground of deportability.220 
                                                
215 See id. at 800 (interpreting that the immigration judge has the discretion to review 
whether or not the detainee has been appropriately charged as an aggravated felon, 
subjecting that detainee to mandatory detention). 
216 See Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 (ruling that Mr. Kim did not request a “Joseph hearing”, and 
therefore the Court did not consider any constitutional challenges to that type of hearing). 
217 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 6, at 160 (discussing three limits on the impact of such Joseph 
hearings); Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring) 
(articulating that the Joseph standard places minimal risk on the governments broad 
shoulders). 
218 See Kagan, supra note 6, at 160 (articulating that a detained respondent for a Joseph 
hearing must request the hearing); Flores, 942 F.2d at 1368 n.3 (Tang, J., concurring) 
(“[f]reedom from governmental restraint is not a right reserved exclusively for those 
schooled in the intricacies of INS regulations”). 
219 See Kagan, supra note 6, at 165–66 (describing how many states limit emergency civil 
commitment without a hearing or neutral review to seventy-two hours or less). 
220 See Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1246 (Tashima, J., concurring) (“Joseph standard is not just 
unconstitutional, it is egregiously so.  The standard not only places the burden on the 
defendant to prove that he should not be physically detained, it makes that burden all but 
insurmountable.”).  See also Kagan, supra note 6, at 160 (discussing the three significant 
limitations on the impact of a Joseph hearing); Noferi, supra note 111, at 68 (critiquing 
procedures available in Joseph hearings); Faiza W. Sayed, Challenging Detention:  Why 
Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process Than "Enemy Combatants" and Why They Deserve More, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1872 (2011) (comparing procedures for immigration detainees, 
which are less protective than those used for Guantanamo detainees’ cases, and arguing that 
the government should bear the burden of proof at a Joseph hearing); Shalini Bargava, 
Detaining Due Process:  The Need for Procedural Reform in “Joseph” Hearings After Demore v. 
Kim, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 51, 54–55 (2006) (arguing that the burden of proof in Joseph 
hearings violates Due Process). 
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C. The ICE Detainer Litigation and Arizona v. United States:  Renewed 
Interest in the Lack of a Prompt Probable Cause Hearing 
The successful ICE detainer litigation, fueled by the scholarship of my 
co-panelist Christopher Lasch,221 has caused courts across the United 
States to find Fourth Amendment violations when counties continued to 
hold a noncitizen pursuant to an ICE detainer.222  The ICE detainer is a 
request to state or local authorities to “[m]aintain custody” of a person for 
an additional forty-eight hours, plus weekends and holidays, “beyond the 
time when the person would have otherwise been released” from the state 
or local custody.223  When local jails honored ICE’s request and refused to 
release a noncitizen until ICE came to detain them, the noncitizens sued 
the jails, arguing that this continued custody was a new arrest for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, yet that it lacked probable cause.224  Because 
noncitizens enjoy the same rights as citizens when charged or held for a 
crime,225 courts have responded to the unlawful seizure of a noncitizen by 
the criminal justice system’s actors by analyzing their cases under 
                                                
221 See Lasch, supra note 3, at 174 (writing about the limits that should be upheld on the 
executive branch’s power to issue immigration detainers). 
222 See ICE Detainers and the Fourth Amendment:  What Do Recent Federal Court Decisions 
Mean? AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/ 
other/backgrounder-ice-detainers-and-fourth-amendment-what-do-recent-federal-court-
decisions-mean (providing Fourth Amendment detention cases). 
223 Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, 2014 WL 1414305, at *2 (2014).  See also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 287.7(d) (discussing temporary detention at the request of the Homeland Security 
Department and that it shall not exceed forty-eight hours, not including the weekend and 
holidays).  
224 See, e.g., Orellana v. Nobles Cty., 230 F.Supp.3d 934, 940 (2017) (holding that the 
immigration detainee’s continued confinement after he would have been released on state 
charges of driving under the influence, pursuant to ICE detainer, violated his rights under 
the Fourth Amendment); Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1004, 1007 (2016) 
(granting summary judgment to class of individuals targeted by ICE detainers on their claim 
that ICE’s practice of issuing detainers without obtaining an arrest warrant was prohibited 
by the INA and finding that that the warrantless arrest power of § 1357(a)(2) did not defeat 
their claim because “immigration officers make no determination whatsoever that the subject 
of a detainer is likely to escape upon release before a warrant can be obtained . . . ”); Miranda-
Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12–cv–02317, 2014 WL 1414305, at *10 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) 
(arguing this was a new arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes); ACLU, ICE Detainers, supra 
note 222, at 3–4 (collecting cases where holding a noncitizen under ICE detainer was found 
to be a new arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
225 See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Protections as 
Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 370 (2003) (explaining how the rights attaching to 
criminal trials, including the right to a public trial, a trial by jury, the assistance of a lawyer, 
and the right to confront adverse witnesses, all apply to “the accused” without reference to 
a person’s citizenship).  See also D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law:  
Undocumented Immigrants and the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 89–90 (2011) 
(discussing cases and briefs in which courts and litigants assumed Fourth Amendment’s 
application to noncitizens). 
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traditional Fourth Amendment principles.226  As Michael Kagan has 
noted, the ICE detainer cases revealed “immigration law’s looming Fourth 
Amendment problem”—the lack of a Gerstein-Riverside probable cause 
hearing when immigration authorities arrest noncitizens for 
deportation.227 
Similarly, in 2012, in Arizona v. United States,228 the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the idea that civil immigration arrests, just like criminal arrests, 
must comply with the Fourth Amendment.229  This case considered 
whether Arizona’s controversial immigration law was preempted by 
federal law.230  The Court discussed section 2(B) of the law, which required 
Arizona officers to make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine the 
immigration status” of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some 
other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an 
alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.”231  The law also 
provided that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s 
immigration status determined before the person is released.”232  While 
the Court found that other provisions of Arizona’s law were preempted 
by federal law,233 section 2(B) was not, because nothing in federal law 
                                                
226 See ACLU, ICE Detainers, supra note 222 (analyzing unlawful seizure of a noncitizen 
under a traditional Fourth Amendment principle). 
227 See generally Kagan, supra note 6, at 158 (discussing immigration law’s lack of a Gerstein-
Riverside probable cause hearing). 
228 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 446 (2012) (affirming that civil immigration 
arrests must comply with the Fourth Amendment). 
229 See id. at 413 (noting that “detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status 
would raise constitutional concerns” and citing Fourth Amendment cases). 
230 See id. at 399 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–1509(A)) (“Section 3 of the Arizona Law 
(S.B. 1070) creat[ed] a new state misdemeanor [that] forbids the ‘willful failure to complete 
or carry an alien registration document in violation of 8 United States Code § 1304(e) or 
1306(a).’”); id. at 400–02 (presenting that the Court held that § 3 added a state-law penalty for 
conduct proscribed by federal law and thus was preempted by federal law).  See also id. at 
402 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–2928(C)) (displaying that the Court also considered 
§ 5(C), which made it a state misdemeanor for “[a]n unauthorized alien to knowingly apply 
for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or independent 
contractor” in Arizona.); id. at 406 (explaining how the Court held that § 5(C) was preempted 
because the Arizona law would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with 
respect to unauthorized employment of aliens.); id. at 406 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13–3883(A)(5)) (demonstrating that the third provision the Court considered was Section 6 
of S.B. 1070, which provided that a state officer, “without a warrant, may arrest a person if 
the officer has probable cause to believe . . . [the person] has committed any public offense 
that makes [him] removable from the United States.”); id. at 407–10 (conveying that the Court 
held that § 6 was preempted by federal law, since the removal process is entrusted to the 
federal government and this statute would create an obstacle to federal enforcement efforts). 
231 Id. at 409–10. 
232 Id. at 413–14. 
233 See id. at 399–410 (outlining the Arizona laws that were preempted by federal law). 
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prohibited states from sharing information with ICE.234  When challengers 
suggested that Arizona officials would delay the release of individuals 
pending information from ICE, the Court stated, citing Fourth 
Amendment cases, that such holds would be illegal.235  The Court also 
stated, “it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the 
United States . . . [so] the police [cannot] stop someone based on nothing 
more than possible removability [and] the usual predicate for an arrest is 
absent.”236  Arizona thus provides helpful, relatively recent, dicta from the 
Supreme Court that civil immigration arrests must comply with the 
Fourth Amendment.237 
The detainer cases look more like a classic Fourth Amendment case, 
because it was criminal justice system actors detaining persons (or in the 
case of Arizona, a hypothetical situation where a state officer holds a 
detainee too long).238  However, the lesson is the same—it is not 
permissible, under the Fourth Amendment, to take away a person’s liberty 
without a prompt probable cause hearing by a neutral decisionmaker.239  
It should not matter who is taking away the liberty—a county that has just 
finished detaining him pursuant to a criminal charge, or ICE.240  In both 
cases, the deprivation of liberty happens while ICE takes its own sweet 
time building a case against the detainee without having to justify this to 
a neutral judge.241  In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Supreme Court 
wrote that “delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to 
justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested 
individual, or delay for delay’s sake” are all unreasonable delays—and 
those were “unreasonable delays” even if the probable cause hearing 
happened within forty-eight hours.242 
                                                
234 See id. at 411–13 (reasoning that federal law actually encouraged information-sharing 
between state and federal officials). 
235 See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 413–14 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) 
(quoting Arizona law dealing with the determination of a person’s immigration status)). 
236 Id. at 407. 
237 See id. at 446 (outlining a reasonable attempt to investigate immigration status with 
Fourth Amendment compliance). 
238 See id. at 333 (demonstrating hypothetical situation of detainee being held too long). 
239 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures). 
240 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (banning unreasonable searches and seizures) with 8 
C.F.R. § 287.7 (2017) (outlining who has the authority to issue detainers). 
241 See Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 218 (1st Cir. 2015) (showing Bivens action 
against ICE officials for issuing a detainer against a U.S. citizen, reasoning that ICE officials 
are welcome to go about their work determining whether there is reasonable suspicion that 
someone has violated the immigration laws, but they just must let the person out of jail while 
they undertake such investigation). 
242 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). 
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It appears that an opening is available in the doctrine for immigration 
detainees to request prompt probable cause hearings by a neutral judge.243  
In the next section, I discuss why such probable cause hearings should 
only happen in post-entry social control deportations.244 
V.  A PROMPT PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING FOR POST-ENTRY SOCIAL 
CONTROL DEPORTATIONS 
Before explaining why prompt probable cause hearings should only 
occur in post-entry social control cases, it is first helpful to define that 
term.245  We are indebted to Daniel Kanstroom for the concept of “post-
entry social control” deportation, which encompasses deportation of 
noncitizens who have been admitted to the United States and who are 
deportable due to criminal or political conduct.246  For them, Kanstroom 
argues, deportation essentially functions as punishment because it 
regulates their behavior and thus exercises continual control over them, 
as does the criminal law.247  Thus, the constitutional protections of a 
criminal trial should apply in these proceedings.248  Kanstroom 
distinguishes “post-entry social control” deportations from “extended 
border control” deportations,249 where the noncitizen has not been 
admitted to the United States or has been admitted, yet violates the rules 
that govern his temporary residence.250  These proceedings are essentially 
contractual and thus it is more appropriate to think of them as civil and 
non-punitive.251 
                                                
243 Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(e) (explaining the procedure of a probable cause hearing 
in a criminal case) with Part V.A (providing a collection of cases that have held that this rule 
does not apply to deportation). 
244 See infra Part V (discussing prompt probable cause hearings for post-entry social control 
deportations). 
245 See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 4–6 (describing post-entry 
social control as laws that proscribe criminal and political conduct as grounds for 
deportation). 
246 See Kanstroom, Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, supra note 14, at 1465 and accompanying 
text (presenting more information defining post-entry social control). 
247 See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 11, at 1898 (expounding upon the 
similarities between immigration removal and criminal law). 
248 See Kanstroom, Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, supra note 14, at 1465, 1499–1500 
(discussing how due process should extend to aliens). 
249 See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 6 (distinguishing between 
post-entry social control and extended border control). 
250 See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 6 (describing the differences 
between post-entry social control and extended border control). 
251 See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 11, at 1907 (presenting the 
proceedings as more civil and contractual in nature). 
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A. Limiting the Remedy to Post-Entry Social Control Deportations 
Why should probable cause hearings only happen in post-entry social 
control cases?  First, the rationale that keeps deportation proceedings 
squarely in the “civil,” as opposed to “criminal,” box, and thus failing to 
incorporate procedural protections such as the Fourth Amendment’s right 
to a prompt probable cause hearing by a neutral judge, does not hold up 
as well in the context of post-entry social control deportations.252  
Following the rationale in Padilla, it is easier to conceptualize deportation 
for a crime as punishment and thus deserving of at least the “quasi-right” 
to a Fourth Amendment probable cause hearing.253 
In contrast, a proposal that encompasses extended border control 
deportations carries much more legal baggage.254  Although the Court’s 
statements in Abel were dicta, they nonetheless proved persuasive to some 
courts afterwards.255  Also, the Supreme Court in its 1993 Reno v. Flores256 
decision rejected an argument that, under a Due Process analysis, a class 
of unaccompanied minor noncitizens should be entitled to prompt review 
of their custody by a neutral immigration judge.257  While Michael Kagan 
offered reasons for why Flores would not foreclose a future argument 
(especially on behalf of an adult immigration detainee),258  I query whether 
                                                
252 See supra Part IV.A (discussing Padilla v. Kentucky). 
253 See supra Part IV.A. 
254 See supra Part III (looking at court challenges to immigration detainee’s lack of a prompt 
probable cause hearing). 
255 See, e.g., Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 913 F.2d 1315, 1337 (9th Cir. 1990), 
superseded by Flores v. Reno, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (reversed by Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (“[o]ur holding is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s forceful 
dicta in Abel . . . though professing not to reach the issue of whether an INS arrest warrant 
was invalid because it failed to comply with the fourth amendment’s requirements for 
warrants, the Court nonetheless devoted five pages to rejecting petitioner’s claim.”); Spinella 
v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 535, 540–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“[w]hile the Supreme Court declined 
to pass upon a similar argument in Abel, . . . some pertinent observations there were 
nonetheless made . . . the court did refer to its frequent upholding of administrative 
deportation proceedings shown to have commenced by arrests made pursuant to such 
warrants.”). 
256 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
257 See id. at 308–09 (displaying that lower courts had rejected similar arguments).  See, e.g., 
Salgado v. Scannel, 561 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977) (explaining why the motion for 
suppression was not granted). See also United States v. Noel, 231 F.3d 833, 837 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(per curiam) (conveying that Criminal Procedure Rule 5(a) does not apply to deportation); 
United States v. Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d 353, 358 (9th Cir. 1993) (demonstrating that Criminal 
Procedure Rule 5(a) does not apply to deportation); United States v. Valente, 155 F. Supp. 
577, 579 (D. Mass. 1957) (Aldrich, J.) (stating Criminal Procedure Rule 5(a) does not apply to 
deportation). 
258 See Kagan, supra note 6, at 151–52 (discussing how Kagan writes that because the Court 
was ruling on a facial challenge, it did not have to consider what would amount to “excessive 
delay” in holding a hearing).  See also Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment 
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trying to make the case for probable cause hearings for the extended 
border control cases is dragging down the vindication of rights by those 
whose cases more closely resemble punishment for a crime, and thus have 
a stronger claim to more procedural protections in their deportation 
hearings.259 
A second reason for not granting probable cause hearings to extended 
border control detainees is strategic.260  Many of the extended border 
control deportations involve entrants without inspection.261  In their cases, 
ICE first carries the burden of proof, which requires them to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the person in these proceedings is an 
“alien.”262  The person in removal proceedings has a right to remain silent 
when questioned about alienage.263  Let us say that, when ICE officers 
arrested this person, they committed an egregious violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights (by, for example, coercing him to sign a statement that 
he was from Mexico).  According to the Supreme Court's Lopez-Mendoza 
decision, the earlier statements can be suppressed in immigration court 
because of the egregious nature of the Fourth Amendment violation.264  
                                                
Problem, supra note 6, at 151–52 (quoting Flores, 507 U.S. at 302–03) (exemplifying that 
because Flores dealt with a child, who is always in some form of custody, and specifically did 
not deal with “shackles, chains, or barred cells,” its holding would not extend to adults in 
immigration detention). 
259 See supra Part IV.A (analyzing Padilla v. Kentucky). 
260 See Noel, 231 F.3d at 836 (expanding upon the list of reasons that detainees are not 
granted prompt probable cause hearings). 
261 See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 5 (describing reasons for 
extended border control deportations); Jose Magaña-Salgado, Fair Treatment Denied:  The 
Trump Administration’s Troubling Attempt to Expand “Fast-Track” Deportations, 5 (2017), 
https://www.ilrc.org/report-expedited-removal-expansion [https://perma.cc/T3EC-
EXMD] (reporting the Center for Migration Studies Data that projects that the 
undocumented population in 2017 is 11,100,000, and of these, 1,025,289 entered in the past 
two years, with 355,167 entering without inspection). 
262 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2012) (outlining the establishment of the alienage of the 
respondent); Matter of Guevara, 20 I. & N. Dec. 238, 239–40 (BIA 1990) (showing the Board 
of Immigration Appeals has held that although judges can draw an adverse inference from 
silence, this does not meet the government’s burden of proving alienage by clear and 
convincing evidence). 
263 See Daniel Kanstroom, Hello Darkness:  Involuntary Testimony and Silence as Evidence in 
Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 599, 602 (1990) (arguing that respondents in 
deportation proceedings cannot be compelled to testify and that this silence cannot support 
an order of deportation).  See also id. at 603 (“[t]here is no doubt that the privilege [against 
self-incrimination] may be asserted in this context, where the testimony sought might result 
in criminal prosecution in addition to deportation.”); id. at 626–29 (chronicling the legislative 
history behind the requirement that the government first prove alienage in a deportation 
case). 
264 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984) (holding that, while the 
exclusionary rule is available in such proceedings, it is only available where there has been 
an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 807 
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However, if he later admits at a removal hearing that he is a citizen of 
Mexico, ICE can easily meet its burden of proof.265  Should entrants 
without inspection have prompt probable cause hearings, especially 
before they have an opportunity to obtain counsel who could raise these 
Fourth Amendment arguments to suppress the prior statements and 
counsel them on their right to remain silent, they might promptly admit 
to alienage during the probable cause hearing.266  These admissions would 
foreclose any opportunity to raise suppression arguments and terminate 
proceedings, since the noncitizen’s statements during the probable cause 
hearing would be independent evidence of alienage.267 
Unlike the evidentiary issues in an extended border control case, post-
entry social control deportations, such as Carlos’ deportation, normally 
turn on evidence of a criminal conviction.268  The statute only permits 
                                                
(1st Cir. 1977) (suppressing noncitizen’s confession of alienage when confession was coerced 
by INS agent).  See also Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 459–60 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(surveying case law applying Lopez-Mendoza exceptions). 
265 See In re Guevara, 20 I. & N. Dec. 238, 241–42 (BIA 1990) (collecting case law to show 
silence and citizenship does not avert removal). 
266 See Chacón, supra note 2, at 1629–30 (“[w]hen a Fourth Amendment violation occurs 
during a search or seizure, or when a due process violation occurs during the government’s 
interrogation of a noncitizen, unrepresented immigrants are unlikely to be able to adequately 
address the complex legal issues that a suppression motion requires.”). 
267 See Chacón, supra note 2, at 1568 (showing that it is possible to advocate for regulation 
that separates probable cause hearing records from the removal record, which would mirror 
the regulation governing the record in bond hearings); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (2013) 
(“[c]onsideration by the Immigration Judge of an application or request of a respondent 
regarding custody shall be separate and apart from, and shall form no part of, any 
deportation or removal hearing or proceedings”).  See also Immigration Court Practice 
Manual § 9.3(a) (“[b]ond proceedings are separate from removal proceedings”); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.7(a) (2013) (allowing the receipt into evidence of an “oral or written statement” made 
by the respondent or another person during “any investigation, examination, hearing, or 
trial”).  The Immigration Judge Benchbook reconciles these regulations by advising 
immigration judges that it is permissible to use such prior statements made in a bond 
proceeding so long as “the evidence is reintroduced and received in the deportation or 
removal hearing.”  Id.  See also Immigration Judge Benchbook, Evidence, p. 3, para 3a-3b; 
Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 2010) (demonstrating that the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, however, did not permit an immigration judge to use her notes from a 
bond hearing in the removal hearing because of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) precluded any evidence 
from a bond hearing to be used in a removal hearing); id. at 1241 (discussing how the court 
did not need to resolve the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) because the judge did not rely on 
prior written statements and, because no transcript existed of the bond hearing, she did not 
rely on prior oral statements); In re Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1126 (BIA 1999) (Rosenberg, 
Board Member, dissenting) (“[t]he underlying purpose of [8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d)] is not to 
limit the information an immigration judge may consider in redetermining bond, but to 
ensure that evidence presented in far more informal bond hearing does not taint the ultimate 
adjudication of the charges of removability.”). 
268 For the moment, I leave out a more fulsome discussion of the type of evidence that 
would cause DHS to charge a noncitizen with deportability for political activity, which 
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certain documents to prove the existence of a conviction—namely, 
certified conviction records.269  Thus, requiring the government to act 
quickly to get these records might prove overly difficult if DHS continued 
to pursue as many criminal deportations as it plans to do under the Trump 
administration (or as it was doing previously).270  The right to a prompt 
probable cause hearing would trigger each time DHS charged a criminal 
or political ground of deportability.271  To limit the number of probable 
cause hearings in which DHS must quickly justify its detention decisions 
by providing criminal records, DHS would likely respond by charging a 
criminal or political ground of deportability only when necessary—i.e., in 
LPRs’ cases.272  Typically, the deportation of LPRs is purely for post-entry 
conduct.273  In contrast, others such as noncitizens who have overstayed 
                                                
Kanstroom also has classified as part of the category of post-entry social control deportations.  
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A) (2012) (proscribing deportation for “any activity a purpose 
of which is the opposition to, or control or overthrow of, the government by force, violence, 
or other means”).  See also KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 6 (describing 
post-entry social control deportations as including deportation for crime and political 
activity).  I am limiting my discussion to deportation for a crime, since my own observations 
from fourteen years of representing immigration detainees and conducting intake interviews 
with immigration detainees has led me to believe that the criminal grounds of deportation 
are more frequently charged; supra Part II (comparing criminal justice rights to immigration 
rights). 
269 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (2012) (outlining requirements for proof of convictions); 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.41 (2013) (presenting which documents are admissible evidence, such as 
records of judgments and criminal convictions, pleas, verdicts, and docket entries). 
270 See Ye Hee Lee, supra note 20 (stating that President Trump expressed a desire to target 
“criminal aliens” for deportation); id. (taking advantage of fuzzy math, President Trump 
claimed that there were 2 million undocumented noncitizens with criminal convictions, 
when in fact there are 1.9 million noncitizens deportable for crime—many are LPRs or 
otherwise legally here—and only 820,000 (about 43% of that 1.9 million “criminal aliens”) 
are undocumented).  See also Casselman, supra note 20 (showing this puts President Trump 
right on par with President Obama’s initial policies, which were to target the “criminal 
aliens” first, and under these policies, Obama deported over 400,000 in 2012). 
271 Contra, cases cited supra note 141 (noting that courts have held that Criminal Procedure 
Rule 5(a), or the right to a prompt probable cause hearing, does not apply to deportations). 
272 Cf. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, 180, 222, 225, 232, 289 (1989) (explaining that 
bureaucracies resist changes to core tasks, will seek changes to core tasks only if it increases 
agency autonomy, and will meet new problems when a policy is implemented unless new 
resources are provided). 
273 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2012) (illustrating that there is always the possibility that 
lawful permanent residents are deportable because they are inadmissible at the time of entry, 
e.g., the noncitizen could have committed fraud in the application for their admission to the 
United States); KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 5 (classifying as 
extended border control deportation of those who have evaded border control by fraud or 
misrepresentation).  See also, e.g., In re Sosa, 20 I. & N. Dec. 758 (BIA 1993) (presenting in this 
instance, their deportations would more easily be classified as extended border control 
deportations.).  In my fourteen years of experience representing lawful permanent residents 
in removal proceedings and consulting with immigration detainees, many of whom are 
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their visas and then are convicted of a crime can be charged either for 
violating the terms of their visas or for the conviction.274  Their 
deportations are a hybrid—part post-entry social control; part extended 
border control.275 
This may lead to fewer deportations, particularly of lawful permanent 
residents, who have the most to lose because they have been admitted to 
the United States, some of them a long time ago, and often have other ties 
to the community that go with long residence in the United States.276  
While our immigration system still clings to the notion that they are 
“simply being regulated,”277 not punished, and fails to provide them with 
other protections like court-appointed counsel, at the very least requiring 
the government to promptly prove the deportation of a lawful permanent 
resident to a neutral judge provides some criminal procedure-type 
protections in the immigration system.278  The prompt probable cause 
hearing is one step in the direction of providing stronger procedural 
protections to LPRs, who, according to several scholars, are more 
deserving of procedural protections that are available to defendants in the 
criminal justice system.279 
                                                
lawful permanent residents facing deportation, I have typically seen NTAs that charge the 
criminal grounds of deportability. 
274 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (2012) (authorizing removal of noncitizen for violating terms 
of visa). 
275 See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 5 (classifying deportation 
statutes for visa violations as contractual in nature because of the “contractual aspect of the 
deal that permitted entry”).  See also KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 6 
and accompanying text (“[t]he purest post-entry social control laws . . . proscribe criminal or 
political conduct within the United States, often without limit.”). 
276 See Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE 
L.J. 2394, 2404 (2013) (analyzing the importance of removal hearings for permanent residents 
that are within the country legally); Markowitz, Straddling the Criminal-Civil Divide, supra 
note 209, at 292 and accompanying text (“[p]ermanent residents, as a class, have the greatest 
economic and familial connections and political allegiance to the United States”). 
277 See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 11, at 1895 and accompanying text 
(suggesting that immigrants are not being punished but “simply being regulated”). 
278 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI (displaying how the right to a fair, speedy trial is so 
crucial that is has been added as an amendment to the U.S. Constitution). 
279 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 276, at 2405 (arguing for court-appointed counsel for LPRs 
in deportation proceedings); Markowitz, Straddling the Criminal-Civil Divide, supra note 209, 
at 292 (“[t]he well-founded recognition of permanent residents, and their precursor, 
denizens, as ‘citizens’ of a lesser status holding rights superior to other noncitizens justifies 
greater protection for this class of noncitizens”); David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership 
in the National Community:  Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 214–15 (1983) 
(showing that a noncitizen’s level of membership in the United States should govern how 
much process is due to the noncitizen and therefore LPRs should receive the most procedural 
protections).  See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and “Community Ties”:  A 
Response to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 244–45 (1983) (stating that Due Process should turn 
not on the person’s membership in the United States community—the United States’ 
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What would truly make the probable cause hearing meaningful is if 
the government had to explain its charging decision.280  For example, there 
are numerous Supreme Court and circuit court cases detailing why 
several different types of offenses are not “crimes of violence,”281 a federal 
criminal law term of art that is incorporated in the aggravated felony 
definition282 and the crime of domestic violence ground of deportability.283  
There are also numerous instances of the Supreme Court reversing the 
Board of Immigration Appeals on the meaning of terms like “aggravated 
felony” in deportation cases, calling upon the agency to use common sense 
in interpreting this term of art.284  What if the immigration judge required 
                                                
relationship to her—but rather on her community ties—what the United States is taking from 
her); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (defining probable cause hearing). 
280 See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119–20 (conveying the meaning of probable cause hearing and 
its justifications). 
281 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States., 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010) (demonstrating Florida 
common law battery, which punished actual and intentional touching, was not a violent 
felony, which is defined as an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another, under a sentencing 
enhancement statute that is virtually the same as the first prong of 18 U.S.C. § 16); Leocal v. 
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004) (displaying that in Florida, aggravated DUI is not a crime 
of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16). 
282 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2012) (showing that an aggravated felony can be a crime 
of violence). 
283 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012) (categorizing the crimes of domestic violence, 
stalking, and child abuse as violent crimes). 
284 For example, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision in 2004, decided, evoking 
common sense, that a DUI statute punishing negligently causing serious bodily injury was 
not a crime of violence aggravated felony, overruling the Board and some circuit courts.  See 
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10 (“[w]e cannot forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of 
the term ‘crime of violence.’ The ordinary meaning of this term, combined with § 16’s 
emphasis on the use of physical force against another person (or the risk of having to use 
such force in committing a crime), suggests a category of violent, active crimes that cannot 
be said naturally to include DUI offenses.”).  Similarly, in a series of decisions determining 
the meaning of “drug trafficking aggravated felony,” the Court found that the Board failed 
to use common sense.  Id.  See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1686–89 (2013) 
(reasoning that a misdemeanor conviction under a statute that was broad enough to 
encompass social sharing of small amounts of marijuana was not a drug trafficking 
aggravated felony).  See also id. at 1689 (quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 54) (“[t]here 
is a more fundamental flaw in the Government’s approach:  It would render even an 
undisputed misdemeanor an aggravated felony.  This is ‘just what the English language tells 
us not to expect,’ and that leaves us ‘very wary of the Government’s position.’”); Carachuri-
Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 581–82 (2010) (holding that a second simple possession 
offense was not an aggravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) because 
it was not punished as a recidivist offense in the state); id. at 575 (citing Lopez, 549 U.S. at 54) 
(“[b]ecause the English language tells us that most aggravated felonies are punishable by 
sentences far longer than ten days, and that mere possession of one tablet of Xanax does not 
constitute ‘trafficking,’ Lopez instructs us to be doubly wary of the Government’s position in 
this case”); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 54 (2006) (“[r]eading [the statute] the 
Government’s way, then, would often turn simple possession into trafficking, just what the 
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the government to explain why existing Supreme Court and circuit court 
cases could be distinguished from the statute at issue in the government’s 
deportation case against the individual?  This would lead to fewer 
wrongful deportations for criminal conduct, as judges would more closely 
monitor overzealous DHS attorneys.285  DHS would be forced to do their 
research before detaining a lawful permanent resident, because they 
would need to supply a prompt answer to a judge why the conviction fit 
within the ground of deportability.286  DHS thus could exercise its 
discretion to only “prove up” the cases they are prioritizing.287 
Returning to Carlos’ case example,288 let us examine more closely why 
he spent thirteen weeks in jail before the immigration judge confirmed 
that he actually was deportable for the reasons charged by the government 
(and thus his detention pursuant to such deportation was justified).  Did 
the lack of a lawyer cause this delay?  Somewhat (perhaps a few weeks of 
searching for a lawyer caused non-action on his case).  Did the actual 
hiring of a lawyer cause this delay?  Perhaps; without a lawyer, the judge 
and DHS would have reached the same result, that he was deportable, 
without considering the large body of case law on why his crime was not 
a “crime of violence” that would render him deportable.289  After thirteen 
weeks of detention, the judge decided that the government had proved 
removability by clear and convincing evidence.  What if the judge only 
                                                
English language tells us not to expect, and that result makes us very wary of the 
Government’s position”). 
285 See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14 (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that 
probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate, so that the inferences of 
“zealous officers” may be checked by a “neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”).  
See also Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals? Discretion, Sorting, and Bureaucratic Culture in the 
U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L & SOC. JUST. 195, 199 (2014) (outlining ICE’s agency 
culture, which perceives any noncitizen with a criminal conviction as a threat, regardless of 
the circumstances of that conviction, and arguing that the Obama-era agenda of 
prosecutorial discretion largely failed because it inadequately accounted for ICE agency’s 
culture); Kagan, supra note 6, at 163 (showing how Michael Kagan has noted that “[t]o see 
the need for neutral review of immigration custody, one need not accuse DHS of willfully 
seeking to wrongfully arrest people on immigration grounds.  One need only imagine that 
immigration officers are human and that they sometimes make mistakes.”). 
286 Contra Kelly, Enforcement Memo, supra note 18, at 4 (outlining that the DHS officials 
should act consistently with President Trump’s Executive Order and grants full authority to 
initiate removal proceedings for aliens as described by any provision of the INA). 
287 See Rabin, supra note 285, at 199 (demonstrating ICE’s agency culture, which perceives 
any noncitizen with a criminal conviction as a threat, regardless of the circumstances of that 
conviction, and arguing that the Obama-era agenda of prosecutorial discretion largely failed 
because it inadequately accounted for ICE agency’s culture). 
288 See supra Part II.B (analyzing warrantless arrests and procedures in the immigration 
system). 
289 See Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1359 (1991) (describing crime of violence cases). 
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had to decide whether there was probable cause to hold Carlos?290  What 
if the judge was forced to make this decision earlier in the process—let us 
say within seventy-two hours of his arrest?  In the criminal justice process, 
probable cause hearings must be completed within forty-eight hours of 
arrest to justify continued pretrial detention.291  This timeline is not as 
strict in other forms of civil detention, such as civil commitment;292 yet a 
timeline exists, and it is certainly significantly shorter than the average 
amount of time before which Carlos had his case reviewed by a judge. 
What would these hearings look like?  First and foremost, the 
government would need to present certified conviction records to show 
probable cause that the noncitizen is deportable under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2);293 for political deportations, the government would likely 
present affidavits or prior statements by the detainee.294  Ideally, if a body 
of case law exists where courts have found similar statutes to not fit within 
the ground of deportability,295 the judge would force DHS to explain why 
the result would be different in this case.296  The probable cause hearing, 
at which DHS would have to prove its decision, would happen every time 
DHS listed a criminal or political ground of deportability on an NTA—not 
only when the detainee requested such a hearing, or when the detainee 
had the knowledge and ability to argue why his conviction might not fit 
                                                
290 “Probable cause” is a lower standard of proof than “clear and convincing evidence.”  
See California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 n.6 (1981) 
(defining “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” as “a higher probability than is required by 
the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard”).  See also, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 
(quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)) (defining “probable cause” as “facts and 
circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had 
committed or was committing an offense’”); id. at 121 (reasoning that probable cause “does 
not require the file resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a 
preponderance standard demands”). 
291 See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113–14 (discussing the justification for arresting a person for a 
brief period of detention). 
292 See Kagan, supra note 6, at 166 (expressing that to deprive someone of liberty, it must 
come within a set period of days). 
293 See Removal Proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (2006) (stating the official documents 
needed for a conviction, such as the official judgement, verdict, and plea).  See also Evidence 
of Criminal Conviction, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41 (2017) (specifying and naming the documents 
needed for a criminal conviction). 
294 To mirror probable cause hearings in the criminal justice system, such affidavits would 
be admissible even though the witness is not available for cross-examination.  See Gerstein 
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121–22 (1975) (expressing that the Court authorized fewer procedural 
rights in a probable cause hearing, e.g., one trial right that would not be available is the 
confrontation right to cross-examine witnesses). 
295 See Lasch, supra note 3, at 187 (discussing statutory language giving broad discretion to 
officials). 
296 See id. at 186 (addressing the authorization of immigration detainers and the steps 
necessary for the issuance of detainers). 
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within the ground of deportability.297  Such a probable cause hearing can 
be combined with what is now the deportability decision at a master 
calendar hearing, so long as it happens within seventy-two hours.298  
Should DHS need more time to meet the higher “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard for deportability, however, these hearings can be 
separate.299 
In the criminal context, probable cause hearings happen without the 
constitutional right to court-appointed counsel, as the probable cause 
hearing is not deemed to be a “critical stage” of the proceedings that is 
sufficiently important to the adversarial process to have the right to 
counsel attach.300  I am not advocating that noncitizens obtain more 
process at the probable cause hearing than they would obtain if they were 
arrested for a crime.301  However, because the detainee is without counsel, 
it is even more critical that the immigration judge require that the 
government actually prove that the noncitizen is deportable, and thus 
pretrial detention is justified.302  It is important that this probable cause 
not merely be a rubber stamp on DHS’s decision.303 
If DHS cannot prove its case at the prompt probable cause hearing, 
then the detainee goes free.  Nothing prevents DHS from bringing a 
deportation case against the noncitizen; the difference is that the 
noncitizen need not wait in detention while the government takes its 
sweet time building a case against him or her.304  Free from detention, that 
                                                
297 See supra notes 178–81 (critiquing Joseph hearings).  See also Kagan, supra note 6, at 162 
(“[t]he central issues [in a Gerstein probable cause hearing] are neutrality, time, and 
automacity.”). 
298 See Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 59 (1991) (permitting the county to 
combine probable cause hearings with arraignments, so long as the probable cause hearing 
occurred within forty-eight hours). 
299 See California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 
(1981) (providing that the “clear and convincing” standard is meant to protect important 
interests in very few civil cases).  This Article is not advocating for a right to counsel at this 
stage. 
300 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 160 (1985) (expressing that to leave a person without 
counsel before trial might be more detrimental than during the actual trial itself and this 
deprivation should not be allowed).  See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1974) (stating 
that to allow fewer compromises would mean to leave citizens at the mercy of the officers). 
301 See generally Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111 (describing the circumstances to warrant a probable 
cause arrest). 
302 See generally Kagan, supra note 6, 142–43 (questioning whether indefinite detention of 
noncitizens that were found deportable was permitted by American immigration law). 
303 See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112–13 (quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14) (“[the Fourth 
Amendment’s] protection consists in requiring that those inferences [which reasonable men 
can draw from evidence] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”). 
304 See Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 218 (reasoning that ICE officials are welcome 
to go about their work in determining whether there is reasonable suspicion that someone 
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noncitizen has easier access to counsel, which in turn may help him or her 
avoid wrongful deportation.305  Why does the right to a bond hearing 
before an immigration judge not satisfy the same concerns?306  After all, a 
noncitizen may request that the immigration judge review DHS’s initial 
decision to detain;307 this bond hearing can happen at or before the first 
master calendar hearing.308  There are several reasons why the right to a 
bond hearing does parallel a Gerstein-Riverside probable cause hearing.309  
First, in reality, the bond hearing does not necessarily happen quickly, 
since the detainee has only one opportunity to ask for such a bond 
hearing310 and, because the detainee bears the burden of proof,311 it is in 
the detainee’s interest to get more time to adequately prepare the case.312  
Juan’s case example demonstrates the delays that often occur before 
                                                
has violated the immigration laws; they just must let the person out of jail while they 
undertake such investigation). 
305 See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, Article:  A National Study of Access to Counsel in 
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2015) (explaining that right to counsel on 
immigration matters has always been a right, but not one that the government pays for).  
Ingrid V. Eagly and Steven Shafer conducted a national study between 2007 and 2012 
researching the scope and impact of attorney representation in immigration courts.  Id. at 6.  
They analyzed over 1.2 million immigration removal cases over six years for the study, and 
concluded that detainees were five times less likely to obtain representation than 
nondetained respondents, and without representation, were more likely to lose their cases 
and be deported.  Id. at 6.  Thus, detention led to a greater likelihood of wrongful 
deportations.  Id. at 31. 
306 See id. at 31 (providing that detainees who are eligible for release on bond remain in jail 
because they are too poor to pay for the actual bond amount). 
307 See Apprehension, Custody, and Detention, 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2016) (addressing that 
the alien must demonstrate to the officer that a release after being detained would not pose 
a danger to society and the alien will appear for future proceedings).  See also Custody/Bond, 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2006) (providing that the bond amount is determined by review of an 
immigration judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R part 1236). 
308 The detainee has a right to request a bond hearing without waiting for a master calendar 
hearing, but many pro se detainees may not realize this.  See Jurisdiction and Commencement 
of Proceedings, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (explaining that proceedings before an immigration 
judge begins when the charging document is filed, but a charging document is not required 
to be filed for a bond proceeding).  See also Wadhia, supra note 4, at 876 (describing that a 
detained noncitizen can file a request for bond even though the NTA has not been filed in 
immigration court). 
309 See Custody/Bond, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e) (expressing the order of a bond determination). 
310 See id. (stating that in order for a bond redetermination to happen, there must be a 
showing that the alien’s circumstances have changed materially). 
311 See, e.g., In re Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. 791, 795 (BIA 2016) (providing that the alien has the 
burden to show and prove that he is not a danger to society and persons).  See also In re 
Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (detailing that the alien has the burden to show that 
he/she should be released on bond). In re Adenigi, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1102, 1125 (1999) (stating 
that the respondent bears the burden of proof). 
312 See Deportable Aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2008) (describing the timeline for typical bond 
hearing). 
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review of detention by an immigration judge.313  Second, in the bond 
hearing, the detainee bears the burden of proving he is not a danger or a 
flight risk;314 this is the opposite presumption of what exists at a probable 
cause hearing—a presumption of freedom, with the government 
justifying its decision to detain.315  Finally, if DHS argues that the detainee 
fits within one of the many criminal grounds of deportability that trigger 
mandatory detention,316 he does not even have the right to a bond hearing, 
unless he can prove that DHS is substantially unlikely to prevail on the 
mandatory detention charge.317  So all ICE has to do is write a NTA, and 
the burden shifts to the detainee for all custody-related matters.318 
Why does the Joseph hearing, which allows an immigration court to 
review whether a detainee is properly included in a mandatory detention 
category, not remedy the lack of a prompt probable cause hearing?319  For 
one, there are significant critiques of the standard in a Joseph hearing, as 
detailed above.320  Also, hearings only occur when the ground of 
removability is a mandatory detention ground.321  For those like Carlos, 
who are removable on a non-mandatory detention ground, his only 
method of making the government prove its case is by filing a motion to 
terminate and litigating the issue of whether his crime actually makes him 
deportable.  But, as demonstrated above, this could take weeks.322 
                                                
313 See generally Apprehension, Custody, and Detention, 8 C.F.R § 236.1 (defining the 
issuance of the notice to appear and when the respondent may be arrested and taken into 
custody). 
314 See Holper, supra note 90, at 81-94 (discussing the burden of the detainee). 
315 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343–44 (citing to a congressional statute 
requiring prompt probable cause hearings and stating:  “[l]egislation such as this, requiring 
that the police must with reasonable promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested 
persons, constitutes an important safeguard.”). 
316 See Apprehension and Detention of Aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (indicating that the Board 
has held that it is not necessary for DHS to charge the mandatory detention ground on the 
NTA to raise it as a bar to a bond hearing).  See also In re Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124, 126–27 
(BIA 2007) (determining if this offense would give rise to a charge of removability). 
317 See In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (describing the judge’s bond ruling if the alien 
is “properly included” in a mandatory is subject to the automatic stay). 
318 See id. (describing that a permanent resident might not be properly included in a 
mandatory detention if before or after the prior removal case). 
319 See id. (explaining that this determination is made by 8 C.F.R. § 3.19). 
320 See Chacón, supra note 2 (expressing the gaps of rights and remedies of noncitizens in 
removal proceedings and how this encourages strict forms of policing in immigrant areas). 
321 See In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 804 (BIA 1999) (showing that the only authority is 
confined to whether the Service had a good cause for charging respondent with removability 
under one of the sections of the Act). 
322 See id. at 807 (stating that the immigration judge has discretion on the custody status 
bond and the judge can use any information that is available to make this determination). 
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B. Addressing Concerns with the Bifurcation of Rights 
In proposing different rights for different types of removal 
proceedings, I am following the lead of other scholars who have paved 
this road.323  In 2008, Peter Markowitz proposed that there should be a 
bifurcation of these different removal proceedings.324  Markowitz 
proposed that expulsion of LPRs for crime should be a criminal 
proceeding, where all of the protections of a criminal trial attach.325  For 
all other types of removal proceedings, they should be deemed civil, with 
the corresponding lack of procedural protections.326  He draws the line at 
admission as a lawful permanent resident and writes that “[t]he well-
founded recognition of permanent residents, and their precursor, 
denizens, as ‘citizens’ of a lesser status holding rights superior to other 
noncitizens justifies greater protection for this class of noncitizens.”327  
Drawing on similar protections for lawful permanent residents, Kevin 
Johnson has made the case for the right to court-appointed counsel in 
removal proceedings only for lawful permanent residents.328 
Through this proposal, I am in no way suggesting that those who 
entered illegally, who are deportable for being present in the United 
States, or others whose cases are more clearly in the extended border 
control realm, do not have Fourth Amendment rights.329  Indeed, this 
                                                
323 See Markowitz, supra note 209, at 290 (establishing that noncitizens who are the subject 
of removal and traditional proceedings have a lack of procedural protections). 
324 See id. (illustrating that this contribution explains a distinction between “exclusion 
proceedings” and “expulsion proceedings”). 
325 See id. at 290–91 (reasoning that the bifurcated approach excludes noncitizens from 
entering into civil proceedings). 
326 See id. (reviewing that the Supreme Court test that determines civil or criminal nature 
of how proceedings should go provides clear guidance on dividing the line). 
327 See id. at 292.  Markowitz justifies this distinction by reasoning that the issues in an 
exclusion case—defense from outside aggression and self-determination—justify the greater 
power of the government in the exclusion realm.  Id. at 293.  Expulsion is a tool used to protect 
against danger within our society, and the central purpose of such protection is to 
incapacitate residents who pose a threat or danger.  Id. 
328 See Johnson, supra note 276, at 2402 (expressing that a person does have a privilege of 
being represented by counsel to removal proceedings, but a noncitizen does not have this 
guaranteed by the government during removal proceedings).  See also Mark Noferi, Making 
Civil Immigration Detention “Civil,” and Examining the Emerging U.S. Civil Detention Paradigm, 
27 J. DOV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 533, 536–37 (arguing that only lawful permanent residents 
should have the right to court-appointed counsel in Joseph hearings). 
329 See Au Yi Lau v. USINS, 445 F.2d 217, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“[s]ince aliens in this country 
are sheltered by the Fourth Amendment in common with citizens, such a reading of the 
Congressional mandate [the immigration statute authorizing warrantless arrests] must be 
controlled by the constitutional standards governing similar detentions made by other law 
enforcement officials.”). 
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would be counter to Supreme Court case law.330  In the 1970s, the Supreme 
Court in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States331 and United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce332 applied the Fourth Amendment to border agents’ interactions 
with noncitizens.333  More recently in 2012, the Supreme Court in Arizona 
v. United States reiterated that the Fourth Amendment applies to 
immigration arrests.334  That the Fourth Amendment applies when an ICE 
officer arrests a noncitizen for deportation is one of the few positive 
outcomes of the 1984 Lopez-Mendoza decision, where the Court refused to 
apply the exclusionary rule, except when immigration officers committed 
egregious violations of the noncitizen’s Fourth Amendment rights.335  
Because the Lopez-Mendoza decision, which has been heavily critiqued by 
scholars,336 dealt only with the remedy of evidentiary exclusion, it 
implicitly recognized that the Fourth Amendment applies to such an 
arrest,337 as subsequent courts have clarified.338  Similarly, the Court’s 
                                                
330 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (establishing that the search 
of petitioner’s car is deemed warrantless and made without probable cause, violating the 
Fourth Amendment). 
331 See id. (explaining that the search of the automobile could not be justified as probable 
cause due to officers lacking warrant or reason). 
332 See 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (describing how the Fourth Amendment does not allow a stop 
and question of a vehicle’s occupants regarding immigration status). 
333 See id. at 878 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the 
person, including short arrests); Almeida, 413 U.S. at 272–73 (providing that searches may 
take place at other places other than the border itself). 
334 See 567 U.S. 387, 414 (2012) (determining that the person’s immigration status is to be 
determined before he/she is released). 
335 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (holding that immigration officers 
can exclude evidence of peaceful arrests of noncitizens). 
336 See Chacón, supra note 2, at 1624 (proposing the application of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule in removal proceedings).  See also Burch Elias, supra note 2, at 1115 (arguing 
for an application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule due to widespread 
constitutional violations by immigration officers and a fundamental change in immigration 
court practice since Lopez-Mendoza was decided); David Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s 
Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7, 25 (2012) (criticizing Lopez-Mendoza 
Court’s reasoning that law enforcement officers are primarily interested in criminal law 
enforcement, not immigration enforcement, and that imposing the exclusionary rule in 
immigration proceedings therefore offers little or no additional deterrence benefit beyond 
that provided by the threat of suppression in criminal trials as “of course. . ., another iteration 
of the spectacular non sequitur”). 
337 See M. Isabel Medina, Ruminations on the Fourth Amendment:  Case Law, Commentary, and 
the Word “Citizen,” 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 189, 196 (2008) (finding that this exclusionary 
rule does not apply in deportation proceedings, but evidence could be admitted in a 
deportation proceeding to prove the deportability of an undocumented noncitizen).  See also 
id. (“[t]he Lopez-Mendoza opinion accepted without question the principle that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to undocumented persons in a criminal proceeding”). 
338 See, e.g., Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 450 (4th Cir. 2015) (describing that the 
exclusionary rule applies where the evidence has been obtained by violation of the Fourth 
Amendment); Oliva-Ramos v. USAG, 694 F.3d 259, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing that the 
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opinion in INS v. Delgado339 also started with the assumption that the 
Fourth Amendment applied when immigration agents engaged in a 
factory raid, where they interrogated noncitizens about their right to be in 
the United States.340 
Nor does the Court’s 1990 decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 
foreclose the argument that noncitizens who entered illegally have no 
claims to Fourth Amendment rights.341  In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court 
held that a Mexican citizen could not claim suppression as a remedy for a 
Fourth Amendment violation when U.S. federal agents searched his home 
in Mexico after they had arrested him in Mexico and extradited him to the 
United States for prosecution.342  The Court examined the history of the 
Fourth Amendment’s reference to “the people” and found that unlike 
other amendments (such as the Fifth Amendment that applies to 
“persons” and the Sixth Amendment that applies to the “accused”), the 
Fourth Amendment only applies to citizens of the United States or those 
with voluntary substantial connections to the political community of the 
United States343  Because he had not established “voluntary substantial 
connections” to the United States, Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez could not claim 
Fourth Amendment rights.344  While the Court stated that the Lopez-
Mendoza Court had not expressly decided that the Fourth Amendment 
applied to “illegal aliens in this country,”345 the Court did suggest that the 
Fourth Amendment should apply to noncitizens who are illegally in the 
United States because “the illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza were in the 
United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal 
obligations,” which distinguished their cases from that of Mr. Verdugo-
                                                
exclusionary rule should apply in deportation proceedings involving Fourth Amendment 
violations); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 70–71 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining that the 
exclusionary rule should not apply because this is a case in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that 
stopping aliens without reasonable suspicion infringed on Fourth Amendment rights). 
339 See 466 U.S. 210, 232 (1984) (discussing that workers were questioned on if they were 
deportable aliens and were subject to questioning by INS agents). 
340 See id. at 218–19 (explaining that the workers’ freedom of movement was restricted due 
to the workers obligations to their employer).  In this case, the Court found that the workers 
were free to leave, despite the INS agents standing at each doorway; therefore, no unlawful 
seizure had occurred that would require the INS to prove probable cause.  Id. 
341 See 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990) (explaining that the facts in Verduga-Urquidez’s case do 
not call for a comprehensive Fourth Amendment analysis).  
342 See id. at 262–62, 274–75 (outlining the facts from Verduga-Urquidez). 
343 See id. at 264–66 (highlighting the court’s reasoning in Verduga-Urquidez). 
344 Id. at 271. 
345 Id. at 272. 
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Urquidez, who “had no voluntary connections with this country that 
might place him among ‘the people’ of the United States.”346 
While I presume that Fourth Amendment rights exist for all 
noncitizens in the United States,347 in this Article, my proposal deals more 
narrowly with the remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment right to 
have one’s detention promptly reviewed by a neutral judge.348  Other 
remedies would still be available for violations of noncitizens’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.349  For example, when the Fourth Amendment 
violation is egregious, the exclusionary rule will apply in removal 
proceedings.350  Also, noncitizens may complain about officer conduct 
during an arrest through DHS’s own regulations.351  These regulations 
deal exclusively with the conduct of an officer when arresting a 
noncitizen, instead of the length of time before which a noncitizen should 
be brought before a neutral judge.352  I do not suggest that these remedies 
are adequate; rather, I leave the critique of these remedies to others, 
                                                
346 Id. at 272–73 (stating the plurality view that the Fourth Amendment generally does not 
apply to illegal aliens). Courts have disagreed about whether the plurality opinion’s 
discussion with respect to whether the Fourth Amendment applies to illegal aliens is dicta 
or binding precedent.  See, e.g., Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, No. EP-03-CA-411(KC), 2005 
WL 388589, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005), aff’d and remanded, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that a border cross-card holder had Fourth Amendment rights and stating that 
“[t]he definition of ‘the people’ advanced in Verdugo-Urquidez is therefore considered as 
persuasive authority to the extent it applies to resolution of the present motion for summary 
judgment.”).  See also United States v. Guitterez, 983 F.Supp. 905, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“[i]t 
is also noteworthy that a majority of the justices did not subscribe to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
[Verdugo-Urquidez] opinion, particularly with respect to his discussion and analysis 
regarding the scope of the Fourth Amendment as it applies to illegal aliens” (emphasis in 
original)); United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1261 (D.Utah 2003) (“[t]his 
court is not at liberty to second-guess Justice Kennedy’s direct statement that he was joining 
the Court’s opinion.”). 
347 See ADMINISTRATIVE AND EXPEDITED REMOVAL:  IMMIGRATION LAW’S NEXT FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PROBLEM (work in progress) (on file with author) (making this argument in 
much more detail in another Article which is on file with the author). 
348 See supra notes 52–65 and accompanying text (discussing the need for remedies against 
violations of Fourth Amendment protections). 
349 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51 (exemplifying an available remedy). 
350 See id. (explaining the Court’s interpretation of “egregious”).  See also Elizabeth A. Rossi, 
Revisiting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza:  Why the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Should Apply 
in Deportation Proceedings, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477, 480–81 (2013) (articulating an 
application Lopez-Mendoza exceptions based on egregiousness); Yanez-Marquez, 789 F.3d at 
459–60 (surveying the application of Lopez-Mendoza exceptions based on egregiousness). 
351 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.10(a) (stating procedures for reviewing violations by immigration 
officers).  See also 8 C.F.R. § 287.8 (outlining standards for immigration officers pertaining to 
enforcement activities). 
352 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.10 (giving the process for noncitizen complaints).  See generally 8 C.F.R. 
§ 287.8(c)(2)(vi) (noting that the regulations only discuss prompt review by a magistrate 
judge when a person is arrested and charged with a criminal violation). 
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particularly those who have called upon the Supreme Court to revisit its 
decision in Lopez-Mendoza.353 
1. Proposed Solution:  Use of Immigration Judges for Post-Entry Social 
Control Probable Cause Hearings 
My proposal is that immigration judges should preside over probable 
cause hearings for any admitted noncitizen who is charged as deportable 
for a criminal conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2); these hearings must 
occur within seventy-two hours of arrest.354  One critique of this proposal 
is the use of immigration judges to perform the “neutral magistrate” 
function.355  Even an immigration judge, Judge Dana Marks, has stated 
that to an outsider, it might appear that an institutional bias is embedded 
within immigration judges’ decisions when they work within an 
enforcement agency, the Department of Justice.356  This is made worse 
when there are allegations of politics playing into the hiring of 
immigration judges, as happened during the George W. Bush 
administration.357 
The history of why immigration judges exist within their current 
subagency, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, contributes to 
this conversation.358  Before the Supreme Court’s 1950 decision in Wong 
Yang Sung  v. McGrath,359 there were “presiding inspectors,” who presided 
over deportation hearings, in the way an immigration judge would 
                                                
353 See, e.g., Burch Elias, supra note 2, at 1112–14 (critiquing the remedies for the problems 
in the current adjudication process).  See also Rossi, supra note 350, at 530 (exploring possible 
remedies for the problems in the current adjudication process); The Role of the Exclusionary 
Rule in Removal Hearings, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1633, 1635 (2013) (explaining the role of the 
exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings).  
354 See supra notes 41–51 and accompanying text (discussing the current process of 
immigration hearings). 
355 See supra notes 41–51 and accompanying text (referencing the author’s proposal). 
356 See Dana Leigh Marks, Who, Me?  Am I Guilty of Implicit Bias?, 54 AM. BAR ASS’N JJ. J. 20, 
21–22 (2015) (“[t]he immigration court system is housed in a law enforcement agency, the 
United States Department of Justice, which is closely aligned with those who are the 
prosecutors in our courts (Department of Homeland Security (DHS) trial counsel). This 
structural arrangement has caused many members of the public we serve, and the attorneys 
who represent them, to doubt our decisional independence.”). 
357 See An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and other Staff in 
the Office of the Attorney General, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, (July 28, 2008), 69, 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E9A-72YS] 
(finding that members of the Bush administration violated civil service laws and 
departmental policy in selecting candidates for immigration judge positions based on 
political ties and recommendations rather than professional qualifications).  
358 See Yang Sung v. United States, 339 U.S. 33, 35 (1950) (presenting the question addressed 
by the Court). 
359 See id. (noting the historical role of presiding inspectors). 
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today.360  Except that these presiding inspectors worked for the INS; the 
only separation was that the presiding inspector was not permitted to hear 
a case in which he had been the investigating officer unless the noncitizen 
consented.361  The Supreme Court decided in Wong Yang Sung that the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA)’s requirement of separating judges 
from prosecutors applied to deportation proceedings; this decision was a 
watershed moment that completely upended the INS.362  When Congress, 
in 1950, decided that deportation proceedings would not be subject to the 
APA because that would be too costly and too cumbersome, the culture 
within the INS had shifted.363  Even though the Supreme Court later 
confirmed that the APA’s hearing requirements did not apply to 
deportation proceedings,364 it was too late; the functions already had 
separated.365  The INS created special inquiry officers to conduct hearings 
and make decisions, and in 1956, there came about radical changes to the 
INS’s hearing structure.366  Finally, in 1983, the EOIR was created, thus 
finally divorcing the former INS from the immigration judges.367 
If immigration judges are once-upon-a-time enforcement agents, then 
why should the probable cause hearing be assigned to an immigration 
judge instead of keeping the decision with a separate ICE officer?368  For 
one, a regulation binds immigration judges to make unbiased decisions;369 
                                                
360 See generally Rawitz, supra note 148, at 686–87 (chronicling the history of the separation 
of functions between the INS and what ultimately became IJs under the newly-created EOIR 
in 1983). 
361 See generally id. at 687 (discussing the role of presiding inspector). 
362 See generally id. at 688–89 (noting implications of the Court’s holding that the APA 
required separating judges from prosecutorial roles). 
363 See generally id. (explaining the evolution of INS procedures). 
364 See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955) (clarifying that the APA does not apply 
to deportation hearings). 
365 See id. at 306–11 (elaborating on the changes of law, including the changes made in 
1952). 
366 See Rawitz, supra note 148, at 690 (showing that these radical changes included:  (1) 
special inquiry officers were removed from the operational supervision by INS District 
Directors, and placed under a Chief Special Inquiry Officer; (2) the Order to Show Cause 
replaced the warrant for arrest and pleadings were introduced; (3) the examining and 
prosecuting officer functions were mandatory in every case in which deportability was 
contested; and (4) there was a creation of a “record file” for the special inquiry officers to use, 
which insulated him from prejudicial material that might be contained in the noncitizen’s 
general file). 
367 See Rawitz, supra note 148, at 691. 
368 See generally id. (noting the separation of functions between the INS and what ultimately 
became IJs under the EOIR after 1983). 
369 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(2), 1003.10(b). 
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but ICE has no such regulation.370  Also, Janet Gilboy’s discussion of the 
“values dissensus . . . at the heart of the current interinstitutional 
differences” in her empirical study of immigration judge bond hearings in 
Chicago in the 1980s also helps to answer this question.371  In this study, 
she saw that immigration judges reduced bonds set by an INS officer in 
two-thirds of the cases.372  Gilboy writes how INS focuses on immigration 
enforcement, with bail as an important tool; immigration judges can strike 
a different balance between effective immigration law enforcement and 
protection of liberty interests.373  Other scholars have continued this 
conversation, commenting on the institutional biases that cause ICE to 
seek detention in more cases.374 
In the current administration, former DHS Secretary John Kelly (now 
White House Chief of Staff) has written memos interpreting President 
Trump’s Executive Orders that prioritize detaining and deporting as 
many eligible noncitizens as possible.375  Former press secretary Sean 
Spicer has stated that such memos have taken the “shackles off” of ICE 
officers, allowing them to deport and detain as many people as possible 
and increasing their numbers.376  ICE Acting Director Thomas Homan 
                                                
370 Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 402 U.S. 
443, 449 (1971) (“[a] prosecutor’s responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the 
constitutional rule of a neutral and detached magistrate”). 
371 Janet Gilboy, Administrative Review in a System of Conflicting Values, 13 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
515, 523–25 (1988). 
372 See id. (discussing the role played by various levels of adjudicatory officers). 
373 See id. at 523–25 (noting the differing values of adjudicatory officers, and how those 
values impact the adjudication process). 
374 See, e.g., Michele Pistone, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied:  A Proposal for Ending 
Unnecessary Detention of Asylum Seekers, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. L.J. 197, 239 (1999) (discussing 
“bureaucratic biases” favoring detention over release of asylum seekers); Rabin, supra note 
285, at 199 (explaining ICE’s agency culture, which perceives any noncitizen with a criminal 
conviction as a threat, regardless of the circumstances of that conviction, and arguing that 
the Obama-era agenda of prosecutorial discretion largely failed because it inadequately 
accounted for ICE agency’s culture). 
375 See EXECUTIVE ORDER:  ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY IN THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED 
STATES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/ 
presidential-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united [https://perma.cc/ 
X2FN-UP42] (showing Trump’s stance on immigration enforcement).  See also EXECUTIVE 
ORDER:  BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/executive-order-border-
security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements [https://perma.cc/V44P-9XEJ] 
(highlighting Trump administration’s policy approach); Kelly, Border Security Implementation 
Memo, supra note 18 (describing Trump’s executive approach to this area of immigration law 
on President Trump’s administration); Kelly, Enforcement Memo, supra note 18 (noting the 
current executive branch approach to this area of immigration law on President Trump’s 
administration). 
376 See Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sean Spicer, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PRESS 
SECRETARY 13 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/21/ 
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stated to the House Appropriation Committee’s Homeland Security 
Subcommittee, “[i]f you’re in this country illegally and committed a crime 
by entering this country, you should be uncomfortable. . . [y]ou should 
look over your shoulder, and you need to be worried.” 377  Given ICE’s 
preexisting culture that favors detention and deportation, an institutional 
ethos that has only grown during the Trump administration, one can see 
the value of having an immigration judge, not an ICE officer, decide 
probable cause.378 
There are also practical considerations with immigration judges 
taking on this new role.  Immigration judges already have crushing 
caseloads,379 especially for detention cases, which by directive by the Chief 
Immigration Judge must be completed within sixty days.380  To add these 
cases into the mix would clearly burden the judges.381  This conclusion, 
however, assumes that EOIR cannot hire more judges, or that the money 
to do so is not available.382  In recent years, when Congress funded the 
Department of Homeland Security each year, there has been a “bed 
mandate” that required funding to detain 34,000 immigration detainees 
each year.383  Many assume this money is necessary for the country’s 
safety without questioning this expense. If we authorize funding for 
34,000 immigration detainees, then we should also authorize funding for 
immigration judges to rule on the legality of detaining 34,000 people 
(although my proposal only speaks to the post-entry social control 
                                                
press-briefing-press-secretary-sean-spicer-2212017-13 [https://perma.cc/SR44-KP2Z] 
(explaining the Trump administration’s stance on immigration laws).  
377 Elise Foley, ICE Director to All Undocumented Immigrants:  “You Need to Be Worried”, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ice-arrests-
undocumented_us_594027c0e4b0e84514eebfbe?utm_source=AILA+Mailing&utm_campaig
n=62b03d74b3-AILA8_6_15_17&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3c0e619096-62b03d74b 
3-290828949 [https://perma.cc/3XSA-D3W4]. 
378 See Rabin, supra note 285, at 199 and accompanying text (2014) (discussing ICE’s agency 
culture). 
379 See Madison Park, By the Numbers:  Why Immigration Cases Take So Long, CNN (Apr. 12, 
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/12/politics/immigration-case-backlog-by-the-
numbers/index.html. [https://perma.cc/C59L-HPQN] (“542,411, this is the number of 
pending cases in immigration court as of February.  The country’s 58 immigration courts are 
already dealing with a crush of more than a half a million backlogged cases . . . ”).  
380 See generally id. (commenting on immigration judges’ caseloads). 
381 See id. (showing a large backlog of cases). 
382 See id. (inferring that judges are not available for this task).  
383 See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 
114–4, March 4, 2015, 129 Stat. 39 (2015) (providing a bed mandate for funding.  See also César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CAL. L. REV. 
1449, 1453, 1505 (2015) (commenting of the statutory bed mandate for funding).  Only this 
year did Congress take the mandate out, mandating instead that the Government 
Accountability Office review ICE’s current methods for determining detention resource 
requirements. Id. 
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detainees, so other immigration detainees would not need additional 
judges for probable cause hearings). 
There is also the critique that immigration judges should not be 
“policing the police.”384  Jennifer Chacón has argued that immigration 
courts were not designed to police the police in the same manner as state 
court judges, who traditionally monitor the enforcement conduct of police 
officers.385  Also, she writes that immigration judges are not only 
overburdened, but their decisions on Fourth Amendment rights violations 
are heavily constrained by a body of law that formed at a time when 
immigration enforcement looked very different than it does today.386  
Requiring judges to hold prompt probable cause hearings in post-entry 
social control cases, however, does not require judges to rule on Fourth 
Amendment issues that would arise when a noncitizen seeks the remedy 
of suppression.387  Rather, the judge looks at whether the law and 
conviction records support a finding of probable cause for the detainee to 
be held pursuant to the violation of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act—i.e., whether that crime is a “crime involving moral turpitude,” 
“crime of domestic violence,” or other category of crime that makes him 
deportable.388  This is not the type of “policing the police” that examines 
the actions of ICE officers when they arrest a detainee.389  Indeed, it is the 
sort of decisions immigration judges make on a regular basis, whenever a 
noncitizen who is deportable for a crime asks the immigration judge to 
hold DHS to its burden of proof.390  The proposal in this Article merely 
requires that they make these decisions more quickly, and in every single 
case where DHS charges deportability for a crime.391 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The time has come for courts to take noncitizens’ Fourth Amendment 
rights seriously.  It is not enough that ICE—the police and prosecutor—
                                                
384 See Chacón, supra note 2, at 1568–69 (arguing that police acts are not generally meant to 
be policed by immigration courts). 
385 See id. at 1568 (“[u]nfortunately, unlike state and federal courts, which have long 
overseen police activity, immigration courts were not designed to police the police.”). 
386 See id. at 1569 (displaying the evolving deficiency in this area of immigration law). 
387 See id. (discussing the way courts are administratively designed).  
388 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (defining various deportable offenses). 
389 See Chacón, supra note 2, 1566–67 (criticizing the immigration system for lacking a 
system that puts a check on deportation detention). 
390 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3) (explaining that in the case of a noncitizen who has 
been admitted, the government must prove deportability by clear and convincing evidence). 
391 See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Learning from Our Mistakes:  Using Immigration Enforcement 
Errors to Guide Reform, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 769, 774–75 (2015) (describing cases of Pedro 
Guzman and Wilfredo Garza, both of whom were U.S. citizens that ICE erroneously believed 
to be illegally in the United States and deported). 
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decide as quickly as they can whether a noncitizen is deportable for post-
entry conduct such as a criminal conviction.  The promise of the Fourth 
Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Gerstein and 
Riverside, tells us that review of a warrantless arrest must happen 
promptly by a neutral judge.  The injustices of immigration law’s lack of 
such a prompt review of detention is highlighted when one sees that many 
LPRs suffer time away from their families, employment, and property ties, 
all because an ICE officer believed him or her to be deportable for a post-
entry act.  ICE officers can and have been proven to be wrong in their 
determinations of who was deportable and thus subject to immigration 
detention.392  The numerous detentions for deportation that already have 
occurred—with many more likely to occur—highlight the need for 
automatic, prompt review by a judge of ICE’s detention decisions, at least 
in the context of post-entry social control deportations. 
                                                
392 See id. (providing the consequences of poor law enforcement and adjudication 
procedures). 
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